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A Study in Police Preparedness to Respond to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey

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A STUDY IN POLICE PREPAREDNESS TO RESPOND TO ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATIONS TO PROVIDE A SAFER LEARNING ENVIRONMENT IN THE SCHOOLS OF BERGEN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY

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ABSTRACT

The research in this study was conducted to explore the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is mandatory for children to the age of 16 in New Jersey it becomes imperative that the police departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the police officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while children are in attendance.

The survey used in the study was sent to all municipal police departments in Bergen County, New Jersey (N = 68). Voluntary participation was requested from the administrators of each police department.

This study can be described as cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental research. There were three research questions which guided the study. The researcher used descriptive statistical methods to address guiding questions one and two. To answer guiding question three the researcher used Chi-Squared ($\chi 2$) statistical analyses. The analyses were conducted to determine what relationship the independent or predictor variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn law enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007) had on each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted).

Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first was between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments and the

number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount of training being done in active-shooter response tactics.

The study has contributed to decision making in the area of police training in active-shooter tactics and training.

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DEDICATION

The bloodiest battles are fought within

This work is dedicated to my wife Kendra and my children Rachel, Jake and Christopher. I love you and thank you. Without your help, patience, and caring I would never have been able to do this. No accomplishment really means anything unless it is shared with those that love you.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM AND PURPOSE

Introduction

Police departments across the United States have made changes to the way they will respond to critical-incidents that occur at schools located within their jurisdictions. The attack at Columbine High School (April 20, 1999) has served as a catalyst for the changes made by police agencies all over the country. In Bergen County, New Jersey changes were mandated by a directive, Directive 05-01 Active-Shooter Policy Initiative, from the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office in a memo dated April 11, 2005 (see Appendix A). The memo clearly states that as of its distribution, it will become the policy of the county to have a unified and consistent active-shooter response policy. This policy, entitled the *Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations*, was developed by and a final version was agreed upon by the Chiefs of Police at their February 24, 2005 Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association meeting, and became mandatory training for all sworn police officers in the county. Also contained in the directive was a completion of training date of September 1, 2005 for all sworn police officers in the county.

The basis for this type of county-wide response policy is in the understanding of the Chiefs of Police and other members of the law enforcement community in Bergen County that critical incidents are likely to produce multi-agency responses. This understanding includes critical incidents that occur in jurisdictions of small to mid-sized police departments throughout the county, and will most likely require the use of mutual-aid from neighboring municipal, county, state, and federal agencies to bring the event[s]

to a resolution. Therefore, when police officers of different agencies are working together toward the successful resolution of a critical incident, they need to be trained in similar tactics. For police officers from multiple agencies to work safely and swiftly together in a critical-incident response they need the same basic awareness of tactics.

Experts agree that violence in schools has become more of a problem since the late 1990s (Peterson & O'Neal, 2002). Society is increasingly exposed to violence and police officers must respond to more and different types of violent situations. One type of situation that is sadly becoming more common is the active-shooter in schools.

Routine-activities theory by Kautt and Roncek (2007) reveals schools as criminal hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and criminal activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors (Kautt & Roncek, 2007). Active-shooters are not limited to education institutions; they are just as common in the work place and in other venues. Police must develop policies and tactics fluid and flexible enough that they may be employed in diverse locations.

As a first-responder to an active shooting in a school, police must quickly assess and react to events taking place. To do this, police first-responders must have training in making assessments and formulating plans to enter schools and save lives. After the development of the *Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations* by the Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association, and distribution of this policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office, police officers in Bergen County will now respond to a critical incident like an active-shooter situation in a school setting in a unified manner.

Although the terminology appears in the definition of terms section, it is fitting to define this phrase now that has been coined by law-enforcement professionals and that is used often in this analysis. The phrase is "Active-Shooter." An active-shooter is defined as a suspect[s] whose activity is immediately causing death and serious injury. The activity is not contained and there is an immediate risk of death or serious injury to potential victims (Borelli, 2005).

Background

Prior to the mid 1960s, police responded and resolved many types of potentially violent situations. These situations created a need for change in police tactics. The catalyst for this change was the deadly event at The University of Texas (August 1, 1966), where Charles Whitman killed 15 people and wounded 31 others from the top of a clock tower. After this event, the modern Special Weapons And Tactics teams were born (Borelli, 2005). These new and specially trained groups of police officers responded to critical incidents of active-shooters in the process of killing innocent people; suspects barricading themselves into dangerous situations, and hostage takers holding innocent people captive. The new teams were trained in tactics that allowed for the successful resolution of these situations.

Police officers not assigned to these specialized response teams were now being trained to respond and secure the scene to allow time to pass when specialized teams could respond. Time was considered the ally of the police to calm situations and allow for the response of special teams and negotiators who came along.

Police departments everywhere again received a wake up call on April 20, 1999 in Littleton, CO. The lesson that day was that the days of police responding to an incident

and waiting for S.W.A.T. to arrive were no longer acceptable when a violent actor was already taking lives. The police tactic of buying time was not a viable strategy against an actor[s] who had no intention of surrendering (Egan, 1999). A goal of the actors at Columbine High School was not to get out alive, as is frequently the case with this kind of event. In an active-shooter situation, suicide is often a part of the plan from the start (Scanlon, 2001).

Police have now modified their assessment of what is expected by first-responding police officers to a critical or violent incident at a school. The new ideas are now taught in police academies all over the country that police are to respond, assess, plan, and engage. Allowing time to pass is the opposite of what responding police officers should do because violent events do not typically last more than 5 to 7 minutes (Wood, 2001). Calculating the average number of people shot during these active-shooting situations and the typical duration of the shooting, shows that once the shooting starts, someone is shot every 15 seconds (Tactical Response, 2008). If responses are divided into 15-second intervals, it is easy to see why police first-responders must not wait to take action to stop the killing.

Statement of the Problem

Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy and only now has begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of information available on police training for active-shooter situations (O'Brien, 2008a). Although violent crime in schools and in general has been on the decline since the early 1990's (Kleck, 1999) police agencies must adapt to changing societal trends where violent critical incidents are becoming more common. In this adaptation, society should expect police officers to

respond to violent situations and resolve the issues they are confronted by. One such issue is the active-shooter situation in a school, which is the foundation of this study.

In this study the researcher attempts to determine if police officers in Bergen County are adequately prepared to respond and resolve an active-shooter incident in a school quickly.

Purpose of the Study

The researcher's purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is mandatory for the children of New Jersey it becomes imperative that the police departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the police officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while children are in attendance.

Guiding Questions

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

Question 2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the *Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations* model policy?

Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

Significance of the Study

Up to this point, the literature in this field has presented an incomplete view of police response to shootings, active-shooters, and critical incidents in schools. Much of the literature and most studies this researcher has located on the topic are from the perspective of the school administrators' response to these situations, attempts at psychological profiles of the shooters and how the media interprets these events. Therefore, what can be uncovered from a study of this kind can assist police administrators in their preparation efforts to combat instances of dangerous and deadly violent situations at schools to better maintain a safer learning environment in the schools of Bergen County, NJ. As education administrators make the school facilities available for police training, police become better prepared to respond to crisis situations in schools.

Most police departments in Bergen County, New Jersey are similar in their command structure. At the top, the chain of command has a Chief of Police or civilian Police Director. Outside the internal command, each police department operates under some direction by the county prosecutor's office, as the county prosecutor is the chief law-enforcement officer appointed by the governor for that county. Although staffing and area distinguish one police department from one another they are alike in many ways. How they differ in their preparedness to respond to an active-shooter situation is the foundation of this study.

Many different methods are available to train for critical-incident responses, and experts in the field have not identified one method as better than any other. Each method is similar in its make-up and basic goal - respond and save lives by confronting and stopping the violent actor.

Delimitations of the Study

This study was designed to explore what police departments in one county (Bergen) in New Jersey are doing to prepare themselves better for a critical-incident response at a school after the distribution of, the *Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations* model policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. The delimitations of the study were: only the 68 municipal police agencies in Bergen County, NJ listed on the Bergen County Prosecutors office website were included in the population (N=68), information to answer the guiding questions was derived from the survey instrument provided to the Chiefs of Police the Civilian Police Directors or their designees, the agencies provided with the survey instrument were also asked to return the completed instrument in three weeks.

Limitations of the Study

Limitations identify potential weaknesses in the study that derive from the design and methods of a study. The scope of this study focuses on the 68 municipal police departments in Bergen County, New Jersey. All 68 municipal police departments were included on the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office website. Since all municipal police departments in the county were included as participants, the research methodology can be considered a census. The number of agencies that return the completed survey instrument is a limitation of the study. The survey instrument used to solicit data was

modeled after the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey. The survey instrument, along with original questions related to active-shooter preparation prepared by the researcher was reviewed by a jury of experts in the field.

Since this study is focused on one county in the state of New Jersey which has a total of 21 counties, the results of the study may not be indicative of the level of preparations by the police departments in the rest of the state. Therefore, any conclusions drawn from the study to apply to other municipal departments in the other counties, county or state police departments, are the responsibility of the reader.

Another limitation of this study is that it is primarily focused on police response to active-shooter and critical incidents in primary, middle, and secondary schools. Although some mention is made of events that occur[ed] on college campuses, the study is limited to how police are responding to the school incidents. College and university active-shooter and critical incidents are mentioned to establish for the reader some key events that were either a catalyst for change or an especially violent incident where police had responded in the same manner as they would have to a lower grade level school.

A section on higher education or college campus violence would not be practical in this study, as it would need its own study to truly report valuable information. Higher education institutions are not considered to be schools in terms of law enforcement, because the student body is comprised of adults. In addition many colleges and universities have their own police departments or security agencies and these agencies report to the FBI's Uniform Crime Report differently than a police department within a county/state as per the Clery Act for reporting campus crime. The law enforcement

agencies of state and private institutions may fall under the jurisdiction of the state attorney general's office rather than the county prosecutor's office. This too would eliminate campuses from the scope of this project as the present study is focused on municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As a result it would not be appropriate for the researcher to draw conclusions about the training and preparations of campus police agencies when they work under different authority than those at the foundation of this study.

Definitions of Terms

The following are definitions that are relevant to this study:

Active-shooter: "A suspect(s) activity is immediately causing death and serious bodily injury. The activity is not contained and there is a risk of death or serious bodily injury to potential victims" (Borelli, 2005, p 2.).

Active-Shooter Team (AST): A team of three or four armed police officers tasked with finding and stopping an active-shooter.

Critical incidents: terrorist activities, hostage taking, mass causality events, high-risk repetitive crimes, riots, or bombings

Jurisdiction: The territorial range of authority or control.

Police Officer: Any sworn member of a state, county, city/municipal police department empowered to uphold law and order with the power to arrest offenders for crimes, misdemeanors, and infractions of law.

S.W.A.T. team: A team of police officers trained in *S*pecial *W*eapons *A*nd *T*actics, equipped to respond to a variety of dangerous situations.

Organization of the Study

Chapter I has presented an introduction of the problem behind the study, a background, a statement of the problem, a purpose of the study, guiding questions, significance of the study, delimitations of the study, limitations of the study, definitions of terms, and a description of the organization of the study. Chapter II presents a review of pertinent literature, research and theory which contains; an introduction, background, a historical summary of events, traditional police tactics, legal mandates for change, new police tactics, problems with the new tactics, related research and theory to police administrators, school violence, a theoretical framework, and a summary. In Chapter III the researcher describes the design and methods of the study by discussing; purpose, design, population, methods, instrumentation, and a conclusion. Chapter IV presents the collected data and the analysis of the data collected by frequency distributions and Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analyses. Chapter V includes a summary of findings, discussion, and conclusions and recommendations for policy, practice and future research.

Chapter II

REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE, RESEARCH AND THEORY

Introduction

The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in their jurisdictions. This chapter presents a review of necessary adaptations police agencies, both in New Jersey and the United States have made to allow them to respond to critical incidents in school settings effectively, tactically and efficiently. These adaptations were based on the education the law enforcement community received from studying the events of April 20, 1999 at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado as well as from studying other critical incidents around the country. Although the shooting at Columbine was not the first time a United States school had been the scene of a deadly attack by either a student or an adult, it did however, have a lasting effect on the law enforcement community. The attack effectively showed law enforcement professionals that they were not adequately prepared to respond to this type of situation and to gain control quickly.

Until the Virginia Tech massacre (April 16, 2007) where 33 people were killed and another 30 were injured (Shapira & Jackman 2007), the Columbine High School incident was the most deadly shooting to take place in a school setting in the United States, with 15 fatalities (Egan, 1999). The Columbine High School incident forever changed how the law enforcement community will plan for, train for, and react to a critical incident. In light of such an eye opening for U.S. law enforcement, police tactics

have been revised and have been adapted to allow police to respond more appropriately to a critical incident of this nature. These new tactics lend themselves for a response not only in a school setting, but in the work place, a private home, a night club or other venue that may come under attack by a would be killer.

In chapter II the researcher reviews the history of the formation of police tactics and what event was instrumental to the establishment of these traditional tactics. The analysis addresses school settings including the Columbine High School tragedy, which served as the catalyst for changes in tactical responses by police departments all over the country. Historical events are an important component of this review because they show how traditional police tactics to respond to critical incidents began, how they changed and how they were sometimes inadequate. An understanding of what police response tactics were is vital to understand how and why they need to evolve to be more effective.

The researcher then provides a description of traditional police response tactics, why they are in need of revision and what these revisions include. Developing an understanding of what the traditional tactics of police response were helps the readers gain insight into why they have become ineffective in many situations. The researcher next discusses legal mandates for change at the local, state and federal levels. A description of the new police tactics to respond to critical incidents demonstrates how police react to critical situations, in a post-Columbine era. An in-depth description of these new tactics, some dubbed *Active-Shooter Response* or critical incident response, suggest the path the law enforcement community has followed to update and make responses more tactically sound to respond rapidly and save more lives. Columbine and other school settings have shown the need for cooperation among agencies in critical

incidents. The school backdrop remains a main theme in the present study because tax dollars are used to fund both police and educational institutions. Because children are required to go to school they become potential targets at the very institutions where their attendance is mandatory.

The review then turns toward training, with a focus on the benefits of training for preparedness and providing police officers with the necessary skills to complete their mission to save lives. The problems associated with training police officers with the new critical incident response tactics are explored. Some of these difficulties are getting police officers to act like tactical teams and focusing on what is most important; the mission at hand.

Related research and theory as they relate to both police and school violence are discussed. Numerous theories and studies are critiqued as they form the foundation of police response and why school violence happens and if there are effective indicators as to who is committing it.

The analysis contains a summary followed by a section in which the researcher describes how the evolution of these new tactics should progress so that police can continue to be effective and relevant to our rapidly changing and ever more violent society. If police are going to be challenged with resolving these types of critical incidents they need training, training and more training.

The effectiveness of these new response tactics is crucial for police to be able to protect the lives of children who are mandated to attend school, and the safety of all citizens in all types of venues. Therefore an analysis of where police tactics were and where they are going to be in the future is important to maintain the safety of our society.

Without periodic reviews of how police are preparing for their jobs, in an ever changing society, the police become stagnate and ineffective. A review of response plans, strategies and tactics allows for changes to be made for police to become more proficient in their job performance. As more police agencies are exposed to these situations the more the law enforcement community has the opportunity to study how to resolve the situations in the safest manner.

Research and theory are presented through the use of relevant articles, studies, professional journals, legal mandates, periodicals and books, as well as first hand knowledge of the researcher and others, to provide the basis for this analysis.

Background

Until the mid 1960s all situations that required a response within a police department's jurisdiction were handled by the department's patrol-first responders. This meant that the "ordinary police officer" on a beat was called to handle whatever happened while the officer was on duty. All calls for police service, such as drunk and disorderly people to domestic violence to robberies and shootings, were taken care of by the patrol squad on the street.

This changed on August 1, 1966 in Austin, Texas. Events on this date served as a catalyst for change in American policing practices at the time. On August 1, 1966, Charles Whitman, trained to shoot by the United States Marine Corps, forced entry into a clock tower building at the University of Texas. In tote with him were three rifles, two handguns, a shotgun and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Oddly enough he also brought with him a five gallon bucket of drinking water and some sandwiches. He had obviously planned to be there for some time (Borelli, 2005).

From the top of the clock tower, Whitman killed 15 people and wound 31 others, some as far as two blocks away. Prior to his assault on the university he had also killed his mother and wife. The first two responding police officers on the scene at the university, who incidentally just happened to be on campus, teamed with other responding police and a civilian and made a brave move to launch their own assault. This ad hoc team advanced on the tower from an underground passage and made their way inside to confront Whitman. Armed with handguns and a shotgun the team was able to draw Whitman's fire so he stopped shooting at innocent people on the campus. In the gun battle that followed, the team killed Whitman and ended his killing spree (Borelli, 2005).

As with most critical or serious incidents that law enforcement professionals face, there were both a debriefing and a subsequent study of the scene as well as the outcome. Debriefings and studies of events are tools used to tweak tactics to make them more effective in the future. This incident was no different. The University of Texas shooting showed law enforcement personnel that there was a need for highly skilled professionals to handle these types of situations in the future. The team of officers who came on scene was courageous enough to take the battle to the killer, but all situations like this may not be handled in as brave a manner. Law enforcement professionals who reviewed the incident concluded there was a need for tactically minded police officers to be specially trained and equipped to handle a variety of situations. Born out of this incident were the modern Special Weapons And Tactics teams, known as S.W.A.T. teams (Borelli, 2005).

Since the early 1970's, S.W.A.T. teams and similar teams with their own interesting and unique monikers like Emergency Services Unit (ESU) and Emergency

Response Team (ERT) began to be formed in police departments all over the country. This was also a time when military veterans were returning from the Vietnam Conflict and there was an abundance of tactically trained and battle tested young men to form tactical teams (Borelli, 2005). The term "men" is used here because at the time policing in the United States was a male-dominated profession. In 1971 after the end Vietnam Conflict, only 1.4% of all police officers in the United States were women (Horne, 2006). Decades later females became more of a factor in law enforcement. Females in policing by 2006 made up about 13 – 14% of sworn law enforcement officers in the US (Horne, 2006).

The newly formed professional teams were tasked with responding to various types of critical incidents. Team members became the experts on responding and handling situations, although not in every agency were these professionals assigned to this task exclusively. Most team members were assigned full-time to other areas of policing and to the special team on a part-time basis. From the 1970s to the 1990s special teams were called upon to handle situations that were above and beyond the capabilities of patrol-first responders.

In the decade, from 1996 to 2006 there have been at least 80 incidents where guns were either brought to schools to take hostages, or kill students and/or teachers and principals in the United States (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). Until April 2007 on the campus of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute (more commonly known as Virginia Tech or VT) in Blacksburg, VA, the most deadly assault on a school was at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999 (Shapira & Jackman 2007). The result of this incident was 12 students and one teacher dead, at least 24 wounded and two

killers who committed suicide (Borelli, 2005). The Columbine High School tragedy took the breath away from the American public. Not because they had not seen school violence before. They certainly had, in the 3 years prior to the Columbine tragedy there were at least 16 school violence incidences, most of which ended with deadly consequences (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). However, this incident highlighted the vulnerability of schools and campuses around the country.

What America saw the day of the Columbine High School tragedy, live via the news media on scene, were police agencies and their officers respond to the school campus and secure a perimeter. Some estimates are that approximately 120 police officers responded to the scene (Shepard, 2006). None of the responding police immediately entered the building to confront and/or stop the killing of students and a teacher. Why did some of the 120 armed police officers not enter a building where lives were being taken by two high school students?

Was this what was expected of police agencies, to sit and wait for a safe situation to enter? In fact it was. The S.W.A.T. era had brought new policies for police responses. Police officers were no longer being taught to act on and take care of every situation as they had in the past. At one point in time the police were the last line of defense, now the police called on their S.W.A.T. teams to be their last line of defense.

Historical Summary of Events

According to the School Violence Resource Center (2007) and an Infoplease (2008) internet document, the attacks described in Table 1, were carried out or were planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack at Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police response

to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to intervene in the implementation of a planned attack. Table 2 is a compilation or frequency distribution of occurrences listed in Table 1 by state.

Klein (2005) asserted that popular discourse addressed school shootings almost obsessively, but continued to omit the role gender plays in these crimes. New research has suggested that this omission was ignoring a key element: a significant number of the boys' own stated reasons for this violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence specifically involving girls (Klein, 2005). A review of Table 1 shows the absence of absolutes in the events. It is important to note a quote from George Santayana, that "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p. 13). Therefore, similar events need to be positioned together to be able to form a complete picture of what could happen at any time.

Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the event on October 4, 2002 in San Antonio, TX describes a female actor. Most attacks occurred inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms; however, some occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The events took place in urban, suburban, and rural settings across all socio-economic strata. When seen through the lens of masculinity theory, the killings of girls who had rejected assailants can be explained as an effort to reverse the feelings of subordination and inadequacy the assailants experienced as a result of being rejected (Klein, 2005). Victims were teachers, students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors in the events ranged from children (6 years old) to adults.

Table 1

School Violence Incidents, 1999-2008, - Requiring a Police Response to a Private Residence or School, Either to Thwart an Attack in Progress or Intervene in the Implementation of a Planned Attack

1. April 20, 1999: Littleton, CO. Two boys, ages 16 and 17, shoot 35 students and 1 teacher before committing suicide. Twelve students and 1 teacher die.

2. May 13, 1999: Port Huron, MI. Two 14 year-olds plotted to kill at least 154 people at school in an attempt to outdo the shooting at Columbine High School. They were stopped when fellow students reported them.

3. May 20, 1999: Conyers GA. A 15 year old wounds six classmates.

4. October 28, 1999: Cleveland, OH. A 14 year old and three 15 year olds planned on killing mostly black students, then die in a shoot out with police. The plot was reported by a parent.

5. November 19, 1999: Deming, NM. A 12 year old shoots a classmate in the head. The victim died the following day.

6. December 6, 1999: Fort Gibson, OK. A 7th grade student brings a handgun to school and opens fire. Four students are wounded.

7. January 29, 2000: Cupertino, CA. A 19 year old planned to attack his high school with guns and explosives. He took photos of himself and his arsenal of weapons. When the photos were developed the drugstore clerk called the police.

8. February 29, 2000: Mount Morris Township, MI. A 6 year old boy brings a .32 caliber semi auto handgun to school and kills a first grader.

9. March 10, 2000: Savannah, GA. Two students killed by a 19 year old student while leaving a high school dance.

10. May 11, 2000: Prairie Grove, AR. A 13 year old seventh grade student who left the Prairie Grove Junior High in a fit of rage and a police officer were wounded after shooting each other in a hay field north of the school.

11. May 18, 2000: Millbrae, CA. A 17 year old with a history of threatening other students with guns was reported to officials by fellow students when he threatened to do a "Columbine" type shooting.

12. May 26, 2000: Lake Worth, FL. A 13 year old sent home from school returned with a handgun and kills a teacher.

13. September 26, 2000: New Orleans, LA. A student fought with another student, went home, returned with a gun, and killed the student he fought with earlier.

14. October 24, 2000: Glendale, AZ. A teenager held a teacher and 32 students hostage for an hour before surrendering.

15. January 10, 2001: Oxnard, CA. A 17 year old entered school and took a girl hostage in an attempt to commit "suicide by cop." After S.W.A.T. arrived he was shot dead.

16. January 17, 2001: Baltimore, MD. A student was shot and killed in front of Lake Clifton Eastern High School.

17. February 5, 2001: Hoyt, KS. Three students, ages 16, 17, and 18 planned to do a school shooting. An anonymous caller reported the boys to the police using a tip line. When the homes of the three were searched police found guns, bombs and white supremacist drawings.

18. February 7, 2001: Fort Collins, CO. A 14 year old and two 15 year olds plot to "redo Columbine." Several classmates alerted the police after overhearing them talking about it.

19. February 11, 2001: Palm Harbor, FL. A 14 year built a bomb having a kill radius of 15 feet. The parents of another student alerted police of the bomber's plans.

20. February 14, 2001: Elmira, NY. A high school student's plans for a school shooting were foiled after students brought the fact that he had weapons on him to the attention of the teacher. He carried 14 pipe bombs, 3 smaller bombs, a propane tank, a sawed off shotgun, and a .22 caliber pistol into the school by a duffel bag and also a book bag full of ammunition.

21. March 5, 2001: Santee, CA. A 15 year old opens fire from inside a school bathroom shooting 15 and killing 2.

22. March 7, 2001: Twentynine Palms, CA. Two 17 year old boys were arrested after police were tipped off by another student about a planned attack of their high school. A search of the boys' homes revealed a gun in one home and a plan in the other.

23. March 7, 2001: Williamsport, PA. A 14 year old brings his father's handgun to school and shoots a classmate in the shoulder.

24. March 22, 2001: El Cajon, CA. Three teens and two teachers were wounded at Granite Hills High School by gunfire.

25. March 30, 2001: Gary, IN. A student was shot in the head while waiting for class to begin.

26. January 15, 2002: New York, NY. A teenager wounded two students at Martin Luther King Jr. High School.

27. October 4, 2002: San Antonio, TX. A 13 year old female middle school student fatally shot herself in the temple with a handgun in the parking lot in front of a group of friends.

28. November 19, 2002: Hoover, AL. Two 17 year old males were reportedly fighting in a hallway when one student pulled a knife and stabbed the other to death.

29. November 22, 2002: Dallas, TX. A 15 year old male student was shot as he and fellow students try to wrestle a gun from another 14 year old student.

30. December 12, 2002: Seattle, WA. A 13 year old male fired a rifle in a middle school, injuring two students with broken glass, and then used the gun to kill himself.

31. December 16, 2002: Chicago, IL. An 18 year old male high school student was fatally shot outside of Englewood High School, while trying to protect his sister from two other male students.

32. January 22, 2003: Providence, RI. A 12th grade student was arrested for firing a .22 caliber gun inside the school's cafeteria after an assistant principal broke up a fight.

33. January 27, 2003: Cresent, OK. Three eighth grade middle school students were arrested for allegedly carrying pipe bombs into their school.

34. January 30, 2003: St. Paul, MN. A 14 year old middle school student was stabbed in the shoulder. Two teenage males were arrested for the incident.

35. January 30, 2003: Jenks, OK. A 17 year old male student armed with a 9 mm handgun climbed onto the roof of the school's gym and threatened suicide. The student also had pointed the gun at an assistant principal.

36. February 5, 2003: Westminster, CO. After several shots being fired in a high school courtyard, a 14 year old student was taken into custody.

37. March 11, 2003: Gilbert, AZ. Six youths were identified by police as plotting to do a "Columbine-style massacre" at their high school. Police and school officials found notes and plans for bombs as well as other violent plans.

38. March 17, 2003: Guttenberg, IA. A 17 year old walked into his high school principal's office to thank the principal for listening to his problems. The boy then pulled a rifle out of his coat and shot himself in the stomach.

39. March 21, 2003: Lawndale, CA. Two teenage high school males were arrested after police learned of a list the two had with names of students and teachers who were targets. An unfinished pipe bomb and directions to make the bomb downloaded from the internet were found in one of their homes.

40. April 1, 2003: Washington, DC. A 16 year old male high school student was shot in the leg during a lunch time argument with another student.

41. April 16, 2003: Addison, TX. A 12 year old student committed suicide by shooting herself in a private school bathroom.

42. April 23, 2003: Houston, TX. A 16 year old male student received a 7 inch slash across the chest in a fight outside his high school during lunch period.

43. April 24, 2003: Red Lion, PA. A 14 year old junior high student shot and killed the principal inside a crowded cafeteria then killed himself with a second gun.

44. May 23, 2003: Texas City, TX. A bomb was found in the home of a 16 year old high school student who had plans to kill the school districts' chief of police.

45. September 18, 2003: Atlanta, GA. A 14 year old Lovejoy High School student was arrested after police said he planned a "Columbine-style massacre" at his school.

46. September 24, 2003: Cold Spring, MN. One student dead and another injured after a shooting in the high school. A teacher was able to talk the shooter into surrendering.

47. August 14, 2003: Columbus, GA. A 14 year old girl went back to her middle school to visit old teachers. A fight broke out behind the school. As a crowd gathered one of the boys fighting took out a gun and started to shoot. The girl was killed.

48. August 30, 2004: Maywood, IL. A 22 year old waiting to pick up his younger brother was shot and killed in a high school parking lot in an apparent gang related crime.

49. September 14, 2004: Memphis, TN. A 15 year old male was killed in a gang initiation "jump in" fight in a school bathroom that got out of hand.

50. October 7, 2004: Newburyport, MA. A 15 year old male high school student shot and killed himself outside of his high school. A result of an argument with a female student.

51. November 17, 2004: Hempstead, NY. A 17 year old was stabbed to death blocks from school in a lunch time gang related fight.

52. November 22, 2004: Philadelphia, PA. An 18 year old former student was shot and killed as two others were injured in a shooting that occurred outside a high school.

53. November 24, 2004: Valparaiso, IN. A 15 year old wielding 2 knives stabbed 7 classmates. No one died.

54. December 10, 2004: Nine Mile Falls, WA. A 16 year old student shoots himself in the head in the entryway of his high school. He later died from his wound.

55. March 21, 2005: Red Lake, MN. A 16 year old kills his grandfather and companion at home, then a teacher, a security guard, 5 other students and himself at school for a total of 10 dead.

56. August 25, 2006: Essex, VT. A gunman looking for an old girlfriend bursts into an elementary school and kills a teacher.

57. September 13, 2006: Van Nuys, CA. A student is shot and killed in a crosswalk in front of school in an apparent gang-related crime.

58. September 25, 2006: Las Vegas, NV. After getting off a school bus a student opened fire at the bus. None of the 34 students on board was injured.

59. September 27, 2006: Bailey, CO. An adult male sexual predator enters a school, assaults 6 female students, kills a girl trying to flee, then kills self as police make entry to stop him.

60. September 29, 2006: Cazenovia, WI. A 15 year old student, disciplined the day before, enters school with multiple weapons and shoots the principal.

61. October 2, 2006: Nickel Mines, PA. An adult male sexual predator enters a one room Amish school and kills 6 female students and self.

62. October 9, 2006: Joplin, MO. A Columbine copy-cat, a 13 year old male, fires one round into the ceiling of the school as his gun jams. A teacher talked him into leaving.

63. October 18, 2006: Orlando, FL. In a fight that began in lunch period over a girl, a 15 year old student was stabbed multiple times with a serrated knife. The student later died.

64. January 3, 2007: Tacoma, WA. An 18 year old student shoots 17 students in hallway of Henry Foss High School

65. October 10, 2007: Cleveland, OH. A 14 year old student at Cleveland High School shot and injured two students and two teachers before shooting and killing himself.

66. February 11, 2008: Memphis, TN. In a gym class a 17 year old Mitchel High School student shot and wounded another student.

67. February 12, 2008: Oxnard, CA. A 14 year old boy shot a student at Green Junior High School causing the victim to become brain dead.

(School Violence Resource Center, 2007; Infoplease, 2008)

The researcher assembled Table 1 to highlight what was (and is) happening at schools all over the country. Cohen and Felson (1979) wrote that several conditions need to be present for some types of predatory violations to occur. They claim that for a predatory violation to be successful an offender must possess criminal inclinations and have the ability to carry out those inclinations, there must be a suitable target, and the absence of a guardian capable of prevention of the criminal act must also be present (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Cohen and Felson (1979) continued to assert that the absence of any one of the conditions described is normally sufficient to prevent predatory violations. According to Small and Tetrick (2001) students are less likely to be victims of serious violent and nonfatal crimes at schools than away from them. American schools are relatively safe places for children to be. Beger (2003) contended that widely publicized incidents of juvenile violence in public schools have created the public misconception that such behavior is commonplace. Although there are not deadly violent acts at schools every day, these examples are an indication of the need for police to be

specially trained to respond to and handle serious assaults and killings on school campus' around the country. Certain areas are more subject to crime because they have suitable targets, and offenders subjectively perceive these areas as feasible locations for criminal acts (Knautt & Roncek, 2007). Columbine became a wake up call for police who need to be prepared for this type of incident (Associated Press, 1999).

Table 1 does not account for shootings on college campuses. College campuses are likely to be patrolled by either campus police departments or campus security departments. Although other police agencies would likely respond to a college campus during a crisis in a mutual aid capacity, the focus of this research is the municipal police departments' preparation. Violent situations, active-shooters, or critical incidents on college campuses would be an excellent topic of a future study or research project.

Table 2 was assembled to reiterate for the reader that there is no one state in the United States that is more susceptible than another to host violent events in schools or private residences. Table 2 shows that events are just as likely in rural, suburban, urban, wealthy, middle-class, and poor areas of the country.

Table 2

Frequency Distribution by State on Events Provided in Table 1 (April 20, 1999 to February 2008)

State	Frequency	State	Frequency	State	Frequency	State	Frequency
AL	1	AR	1	AZ	2	CA *	10
CO	4	D.C. **	1	FL	3	GA	4
IA	1	IL	2	IN	2	KS	1
LA	1	MA	1	MD	1	MI	2
MN	3	MO	1	NM	1	NV	1
NY	3	OH	2	OK	3	PA	4
RI	1	TN	2	TX	5	WA	3
WI	1	VT	1				

* The city of Oxnard, CA had two reported incidents
** Washington D.C.

Traditional Police Tactics

Prior to the birth of the S.W.A.T. concept, ordinary police officers handled every situation. The teams would respond to an incident, gather intelligence, formulate a plan of action and execute the plan. After the arrival of S.W.A.T., patrol officers were taught they need not be as aggressive and assume the risk of encountering armed gunmen or assailants: professionals would handle that type of situation (Borelli, 2005). This became the new and what is referred to from this time on in this study as the "traditional response," in which the policing personnel were to respond and wait.

Police administrators began to advocate the training of patrol officers in a support role for the specially trained teams. Police began to train for responding to critical incidents, setting up perimeters and securing the area for the special response. Patrol's

response edict became to isolate, contain, and negotiate. These methods were used as a sort of clock-stopping mechanism to buy time for the "specials" to arrive (Baker, 2005).

Present for the Columbine School siege was a School Resource Officer or SRO, a police officer who is stationed at the school to handle whatever problem that may arise on campus. Normally, this is the police officer who knows the layout of the school the best and is most familiar with the school and how to move around in it. While stationed at the school, this officer should be continuously gathering intelligence about the school, the teachers, staff, and the students. This intelligence may be used for purpose of detection and prevention of problems before they arise and deterrence of violent attacks. However, this officer remained behind cover, safe, while students were still being killed in the building, rather than to enter and confront the shooters (Kopel, 2006).

The traditional practice of containment of the situation and waiting for S.W.A.T. to arrive had been in practice since the 1970s. Hostage takers and barricaded suspects were very adequately handled by securing an area and calling for negotiators to come and try to resolve the matter. Some events can be controlled by buying extra time and allowing for reasoning with the aggressor to take place (Scanlon, 2001).

S.W.A.T. tactics are normally slow and deliberate movements made to insure the safety of the team members. Once a team has made entry into a building or other facility, members move slowly as a cohesive unit. The team members clear every space they occupy and pass by before moving on to the next possible threat. The time needed by a single S.W.A.T. team to clear a building the size of Columbine High School methodically could be hours. At Columbine, three teams were eventually inserted into the building.

However, if there is an active-shooter, who is seriously wounding and/or killing people, the first responding officers need to make a rapid assessment of the incident and make entry to stop the suspect[s] (Scanlon, 2001). The breakdown of the traditional-style police response at Columbine was that the first arriving officers responded, but then held and waited for S.W.A.T. The S.W.A.T. team arrived and began its assessment and eventual entry into the building. This entry was criticized by some as being too slow and methodical, which is, incidentally, what these teams are known for, slow and methodical searches (Egan, 1999).

The shooting in Columbine High School was over in 16 minutes, more than double the average amount of time these types of situations last, which by some estimates is between 5 to 7 minutes (Wood, 2001). The first-entry team entered the building at approximately 46 minutes after the shooting had begun, or 30 minutes after the killing had stopped. A review of the incident and its many hazards including the multiple bombs and IEDs (improvised explosive devices) can certainly justify the type of slow methodical response that S.W.A.T. used (Marx & Mayhood, 2001). However, to horrified parents or concerned citizens watching the media coverage, the thought certainly was that the police should go into the school and save the kids inside.

This slow response by a tactical team would be warranted by the information police were developing about the numerous explosions that had already gone off inside the school. They were also receiving information about the location of other explosive devices planted in and around the school and in cars located in the parking lots. Police were being told by students who escaped the school that there were as many as eight

gunmen in the building, snipers on the roof and gunmen in the ceilings (Associated Press, 1999).

The rule of thumb in most police circles is that the police cannot help anyone if they are injured themselves. Had the S.W.A.T. team just rushed into the building they very well may have been the next set of victims in the massacre. Bombs squads had also responded and begun to make their own evaluations of the scene.

Police, prior to 1999, had been trained to make assessments, gather information, set up command posts and make the proper notifications. There was no textbook response for a situation like this one because this was a relatively new type of incident (Associated Press, 1999). In this case police were just reacting.

For police to begin to deal with this situation effectively other resources were needed to be requested to handle various parts of the job. Responding units need updated and timely information on which location is the safest to respond. Officers need to know the location of the command post so they will know where to report in once on scene.

The one aspect of this response that was glaringly absent was a determination by someone, a leader, a supervisor, a ranking officer to give the order to make entry to the facility and confront the shooter[s] to stop the killing of innocent people. This way of thinking only came as a result of the Columbine tragedy. In the aftermath, the incident was reviewed and dissected, and in doing so law enforcement professionals realized that something needed to happen. These traditional police response tactics had been shown to be ineffective for the Columbine type of crisis. Tactics that police were using needed to change, was the conclusion recognized on the federal, state and local levels of law enforcement.

Legal Mandates for Change

Following highly publicized campus shootings law makers have had to make school safety more of a priority (Beger, 2003). In the wake of Columbine, the United States government response to the issue of critical incidents in schools and on college campuses has been to make grant monies available so that school administrators could work with law enforcement personnel to implement safety programs (Bethel, 2005). These anti-violence campaigns are useful in prevention and in the education of students and educators.

Through the many pages and documents this researcher has reviewed to collect details for the literature review, most of the literature in professional journals on this topic was found to be directed toward school preparation and response: The law enforcement element of this topic was not as widely discussed or researched. There seems to be a failure to address the issue of the successful resolution of a violent and/or critical incident in a school or on a college campus. Since the Virginia Tech massacre the federal government made additional monies available for the training and equipping of campus police officers to respond to critical incidents on campuses.

In January of 2002 the State of New Jersey passed legislation which created a School Violence Awareness Week. This legislation was intended to make it known that it is in the public interest of the state to designate a week in October of each year as "School Violence Awareness Week" to provide students, parents, school district and law enforcement personnel with an opportunity to discuss methods to keep schools safe from violence, to create school safety plans, and to recognize those students in need of help.

In Bergen County, New Jersey a directive (Directive 05-01) was distributed to all Police Chiefs within the county mandating basic training for all active sworn law enforcement officers employed therein in a uniform and consistent active-shooter response. This training was required to be completed by September 1, 2005. Bergen County distributed a model policy to police agencies, to adopt as their own or modify as necessary to suit the needs of their respective jurisdiction.

Not until July, 2007, did the State of New Jersey follow suit by mandating that all police departments have and maintain a policy and procedure for an active-shooter response. This directive created mandatory training of all police recruits in the topic area of active-shooter response while recruits are engaged in a police academy training curriculum (NJ Attorney General Directive 2007-01).

In September, 2007, a report, "K-12 School Security Task Force Report" was presented to New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine. This report discussed the topic of safer schools throughout the state and concluded with recommendations for a distribution of model policies on topic areas such as: active-shooter, bomb threats, lockdown, evacuation and a public information officer (School Security Task Force, 2007). (As of late 2008, the researcher has not located the model policies to have been distributed).

Progress is being made in school safety. A U.S. Department of Education survey found that 96% of public schools required visitors to sign in before entering the school building (National Center for Education Statistics, 1998). According to Garcia (2003) the good news is that school homicide and violence is down, however the bad news is that the number of rare multiple victim school shootings had increased in the mid 1990s.

New Police Tactics

Environment is a powerful inhibitor or facilitator of crime and situational prevention strategies can affect its likelihood of occurrence (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Weisburd et al., 2006). American schools have had to alter how they do business and how they protect their students (Harper, 2000).

Active-shooters typically work within a plan they have developed. These plans are normally tactically laid out and well developed. These plans typically will include randomly shooting victims, as many as they can, before committing suicide. Not many of these actors are motivated by "getting out alive" or eventually having their day in court; suicide is usually a part of the plan (Scanlon, 2001). Time, which had always been the ally of the responding specialized teams en route to the crisis, is now working against them (Egan, 1999).

The first responding police to the scene of an active-shooter situation are now responsible for making a rapid assessment of not only all of the previously mentioned criteria, but now they must decide whether to form up into teams and launch an assault of their own. This assault goes by many different names. In New Jersey it is called Active-Shooter Response by law enforcement, in Ohio it is called QUAD or Quick Action Deployment, in other areas of the country it is known as Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD). Regardless of the name of the deployment tactics, most are nearly identical in practice. They all are based upon the first responding police officers to a scene, equipping themselves and forming up into three or four-person teams. These teams are sometimes known as ASTs, short for Active-Shooter Teams. The officers or

teams then make an entry into the structure or facility that is under attack and as quickly as possible find the aggressor[s] and stop them.

These types of tactics are situation-dependant though. They are not the answer to every situation. If the officers are responding to a bank robbery or to a hostage situation, these tactics are not appropriate. Police rushing into these types of events may cause more harm than good. Time has always proven to be an asset when dealing with an event in the absence of gunfire or killing. That being said, if there is shooting going on or if people are being assaulted or killed the police have a moral obligation to make entry to try to save innocent lives (Lloyd, 2000).

The premise behind the new system of tactics is quite simple. After an initial assessment is made and information is provided to the police that there is an active-shooter in a building or facility, the police will enter to locate and stop the shooting. This is done in a rapid but organized manner and with tactics that have been shown to be effective. The officers will form into three or four-person teams, preferably the latter. If they have special equipment, they equip themselves as such. Some special equipment may include: breaching tools (tools used to open doors and windows forcibly), assault type rifles / long guns, extra gear such as ballistic helmets and tactical vests that carry extra handcuffs and magazines loaded with ammunition or first aid equipment.

The team leader - whoever in the group is the most tactically minded or the best thinker under pressure, regardless of rank - will direct the team to the chosen entry point. In this regard the mission has the greatest chance for success; ability is put before ego (Giduck, 2005). Safety is always a concern but speed is important. The team will stack

(a single-file formation) prior to entry into the building and perform a quick gear check to make sure all team members have what they need. The team then enters the site.

Team members each have specific responsibilities. Once inside a structure the team spreads out into a diamond formation. The front or first person inside is responsible for all threats that are ahead of the team. The second person or the right side in the diamond-style formation covers threats to the right of the group. This is typically the team leader position. The threats may include windows or doors the group will pass. The left side or third person will cover all threats to the left. The last or fourth person is responsible for the rear safety, essentially to protect the group from any threat from the rear and everything the group has already passed. This position is very difficult for two reasons; this operator is (a) walking backward and trying to keep up with members of a team walking forward at a rapid and stressful pace, and (b) is walking blind into battle with total reliance on other team members to cover their assignments.

One major difference between this type of entry and a S.W.A.T.-type entry is the rapid movement past un-cleared areas. S.W.A.T. operators are taught <u>not</u> to pass areas they have not checked and cleared. An AST will move past everything until they encounter, confront, and stop the shooter because they are moving to the sound of the gunfire, or attack.

What makes this group so effective is that they are constantly moving toward the actor or shooter. The group is directed either by updated intelligence from the command structure outside the building or by intelligence they have gathered on their own inside the building. Intelligence inside the building comes from various sources, such as from students or teachers or employees running away from the source of violence to save

themselves, or from their own eyes, ears, and observations. Either way, the group's plan is to move to the violent actor, confront him, contain him, stop him, arrest him, or engage him in battle. There are basically three ways these situations end (a) suicide, (b) surrender, or (c) termination (Borelli, 2005).

Problems with the New Tactics

These tactics may seem simple when explained in lay terms. The police respond, assess the situation, and enter to stop the shooter. This sounds like an easy sell to police officers. However, some parts of these tactics are very difficult to train for. The most difficult aspect of this is to train the responding police officers that they must pass injured victims and walking wounded: step over or around them if necessary to meet their objective.

Yes, pass and leave the wounded: walk right past injured teachers and students alike. The reason behind this unappealing and certainly unorthodox method of rescue is to put an end to the shooting quickly. The primary way to reduce the number of potential victims is to neutralize the shooter (Scanlon, 2001). One bright side to the new tactics is that the team will communicate the location of the injured and any other available information to the command post outside. The incident commander will decide to form a rescue team specifically to retrieve the wounded.

If the inserted police officers who make up the ASTs get tied up with evacuation efforts, with trying to treat and rescue the injured occupants of the building or by searching rooms prior to passing, precious time is lost and the shooter is creating more victims (Scanlon, 2001). A school or workplace could house hundreds of potential victims. An effective use of the first responders is to install them into the area as

"hunters": they must hunt the aggressor, pass by all others, and focus on their mission to stop the killing of innocent victims.

Acting as hunters is a difficult concept to train to a group of people who have sworn to protect the citizens they serve. Most of a municipal police officer's job is service-related. Police respond to more medical calls then they do to crimes in progress. Police are accustomed to rendering first aid in a multitude of situations, from aid calls to car accidents to slip and falls. Medical treatment would come more naturally to most police officers than acting in a combat capacity.

The thought process behind this seemingly violent transition between police officer and combatant is that people are dying waiting for you, the responding police officer, to stop the person[s] doing the killing. To accomplish this, police must act more like a military unit than a municipal police department. They must train to act fast and with a maximum level of violence in order to take control of a bad situation therefore saving lives (Giduck, 2005). Police have to be trained to think of these situations more as a battle ground than a crime scene (Giduck, 2005). During the heat of battle, the focus must be to stop the enemy by getting to and engaging the enemy quickly to end the conflict.

The researcher acts as a trainer of these new tactics in a mid-sized municipal police agency and along with a partner and co-trainer, identifies those police officers in that agency who should never join the battle. Those that were identified should sooner be sent to where nothing violent is occurring rather than risk their incompetence getting brave police officers, willing to risk their own lives to save others, hurt or killed. These police officers either lack the requisite skills to be a part of an ad hoc tactical team or just

cannot handle the stresses associated with this type of situation. Before the shooting starts, is the time to take a realistic inventory of what human and material resources are available to supervisors who will staff the command posts.

School Resource Officer

Many reports on the choice of a School Resource Officer (SRO) call for a rigorous selection process for those who will be assigned to the schools. It just so happens that these police officers are typically the first on scene at a school shooting incident (Fairburn & Grossman, 2000). These police officers are stationed at area schools and are positioned to be a vital part of a team inserted into a school. They should have the best knowledge of the layout of the school and may also be able to identify the actor/student doing the killing when only being provided with a name.

An SRO needs to be able to switch into a combat mode at the drop of the hat because they have trained hard for this very type of situation. Let the teachers do the teaching at the schools and have the police do the policing. The job of the SRO should be to continuously be alert, prevent and react. In the absence of prevention they should be able to switch gears and react to be the front line in the battle, bringing the battle to the potential killer, whoever it may be (Fairburn & Grossman, 2000).

To provide high quality protection for our children takes training and more training. The training requires time in the schools practicing for these very types of events. The training has to include planning for other aspects that go along with critical incident response, such as setting up perimeters, evacuation routes, staging areas for other responding services and the like. The agencies that fail to plan for this type of event to

occur in their jurisdictions will have the most difficulty dealing with violence when it happens. And it could happen anywhere.

One difficulty in training police is that all police executives are not sold on the costs and benefits of this training. Some police executives have been in policing for many years. Therefore, it is highly likely that they came into police work with a different mindset, one devoted to old-style policing where police responded and waited to secure the area. Justification for spending money on new equipment and training for their police departments when they had always relied on the local, regional or county S.W.A.T. team to handle tough situations may be difficult for them. The rationale behind this sentiment is that S.W.A.T. teams train for critical incidents, so let them handle it. It is their job. The problem with this mentality is the time that is lost while S.W.A.T. is responding cannot be reclaimed; as more time goes by more victims are likely to be injured or killed. As stated in chapter 1, every 15 seconds another victim is shot during an event of this kind (Tactical Response Staff, 2008) so time cannot be spent waiting.

Research and Theory Related to Police Administrators

There is an assumption among organization leaders and theorists that structure influences behavior (Ouchi, 1977). According to Mintzberg (1979) action planning specifies method and time frames for decisions and actions. Perrow (1986) described rules that govern conditions of work and specify standard processes for carrying out tasks, will help to ensure that similar situations are handled uniformly. Bolman and Deal (2003) stated several of their assumptions of the structural frame; organizations: achieve established goals and objectives; increase efficiency and enhance performance through

specialization and division of labor; and coordination and control ensure diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh, through the use of structure.

Mintzberg's (1979) theory of action planning is a clear fit for police preparedness because it accounts for how the job is done rather than specifically relying on the outcome of the operation. In the type of police operation at the foundation of this study, there will not always be positive results. Innocent people will lose their lives as police move to their target. The police may have to pass by injured people on their way to achieve their action plan. This tactical decision to save more lives by stopping the shooter rather than to save the lives of the already injured can be applied to the heart of Mintzberg's theory. The objective of success is more difficult to measure so it becomes necessary to assess how the job is done. When innocent people die, it is difficult to call a mission a success. However, using Mintzberg's action planning theory as a gauge, persons in a debriefing session could look at the result of the mission: If lives were saved by stopping the shooting was the mission a success?

The theory of rules discussed by Perrow (1986) can also be applied to police training. This theory again allows for interoperability of police departments that normally do not work together. If all agencies are training in the same tactics then the likelihood of an operation that is jointly undertaken (interoperability) will be successful greatly increases.

The theories that are a part of the foundation of the structural frame as discussed in Bolman and Deal (2003) lend themselves rather neatly to the field of policing. Police officers work under very structured conditions that are rule oriented. In the field of

policing there is a very clear chain of command and the structure of police departments and their level of preparation will determine the outcome of the situations they face.

The assumptions described by Bolman and Deal (2003) that people in organizations achieve established goals and objectives can be applied to police training because there must be a clear and concise plan established to determine what tactics will be taught. The assumption concerning increased efficiency and enhanced performance through specialization and division of labor (Bolman & Deal, 2003) applies to police training for critical-incident response in that specialization and division of labor allows police to train for specific tasks and excel in their performance. The more successful the police officer is at their assigned task the more likely the mission will result in success.

To date, most research on school shootings has been conducted by psychologists who have focused on mental illnesses and problems of the offenders however; little attention has been paid to the social and cultural contexts of these incidents (Fox & Harding, 2005). Less attention has been paid to the law enforcement aspect of this problem. This researcher has found no studies focused on the best method for law enforcement officers to respond and deal with a school shooting.

School Violence

According to Currie (1985) many theories on juvenile violence were flawed because they were somehow separate from social policies, inequality, racism, unemployment and neglect. Currie called the failure to address these other issues the "fallacy of autonomy" (Currie, 1985, p. 185).

In their general theory of crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) stated that low self control in the pursuit of self interest causes crime. Their assumption is based on

parenting deficiencies for those that are more likely to express themselves defiantly and in criminality.

Organizational deviance occurs when events that are created by or in organizations do not conform to an organization's goals or expectations and produce unanticipated and harmful outcomes (Vaughan, 1999, p273). After a 2 year study, O'Toole (1999) concluded that no research exists that has identified traits and characteristics that can reliably distinguish school shooters from other students. O'Toole's (1999) study asserted that many studies of school shootings were based predominantly upon media accounts of the events. These accounts would often be flawed because the media did not enjoy access to confidential law enforcement and school files (O'Toole, 1999). O'Toole (1999) identified personality and behavioral traits that many school shooters possess; although O'Toole stressed that none of the traits should carry more weight than the other. O'Toole concluded the report with the recommendation that school and police administrators use threat assessment to thwart possible attacks. A threat was defined as an expression of intent to do harm or act out violently against some one or something. The threat can be oral, written or symbolic (O'Toole, 1999).

The U.S. Secret Service (2002b) advocates responsible bystander behavior where students with knowledge of events or threats should inform responsible adults. This would allow for problems to be addressed before they end in potential school violence.

Coordination and control help to ensure that diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh (Bolman & Deal, 2003). This theory is the premise behind having a unified response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents. Through the use of

structure, police officers from various agencies are able to work safely and effectively together.

Fox and Harding (2005) studied organizational deviance as a factor of school violence. According to Fox and Harding (2005) rampage school shootings fit Vaughan's definition of organizational deviance because the violence deviates from formal design goals and normative standards or expectations.

Kurtz and Nofziger (2005) stated that using routine-activities theory and or a lifestyle model to study juvenile exposure to violence is a useful tool. In their study, data from a nationally representative sample demonstrates that routine-activity of lifestyles that expose juveniles to violence serve as and important risk factor for juveniles offending violently (Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). However, Kurtz and Nofziger (2005) pointed out that many studies of juvenile violence tend to focus on friends, family and violent juveniles. The gap in the research appears to be that routine activities or lifestyle create a situation where the juvenile may be an innocent bystander to violent crime (Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). Juveniles become at risk because of the violence they witness rather than the violence in which they are a participant.

According to Gottfredson, Gottfredson, Gottfredson and Payne (2005) recent attempts to prevent serious violent crime in schools have been focused on identifying the characteristics of the offenders. The study had been undertaken to try to successfully identify potential shooters before they act (Gottfredson et al., 2005). A more accurate way to track school violence is to identify the schools with elevated crime rates and violent incidents (Gottfredson et al., 2005). The basis for this theory is that prior studies on school characteristics as predictors of deviant or violent behavior have shown that

community characteristics, school structural characteristics along with variables outside of the control of school administrators are effective predictors of the level of disorder in schools (Gottfredson et al, 2005).

Optimistic bias (Chapin & Coleman, 2006; Weinstein, 1980) refers to the perception that bad things happen to other people. Reduction of optimistic bias in regard to school violence is an important step in creating an understanding in students' personal risks, getting them to take threats seriously and taking self-protective measures (Chapin & Coleman, 2006). The Chapin and Coleman (2006) study was the first study of optimistic bias in the context of school violence. Other studies have used optimistic bias to study violence in the context of violence against women and child abuse (Chapin & Coleman, 2006). The validity of direct application of results the study may be questionable in that it was conducted on a small scale in one county in Pennsylvania. Policy recommendation for both police and school administrators may require the study to be replicated on a larger scale.

Routine-activities theory (Kautt & Roncek, 2007) revealed that schools can be criminal hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and criminal activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors.

Pies (2007) called for a "distant early warning" system of indicators to identify troubled students. This can only be done when the full resources of doctors, parents, schools, and communities are combined to reduce the plague of violence in our culture (Pies, 2007).

This information is equally as important to school administrators as it is to police administrators that are trying to understand violence in schools. School administrators

can work toward intervention strategies when armed with knowledge of what types of students have the potential to be violent and from what set of circumstances they come from. This is not a be all and end all. There is no crystal ball to predict the future acts of school violence. School administrators can work toward putting measures in place when they become aware of students that may be in crisis mode as defined by the numerous theories previously discussed. The true benefit of a mutual knowledge shared by both police and school administrators is that information can be shared in a symbiotic relationship to ensure a safer learning environment for all students.

Theoretical Framework

To establish a strong relationship between the number of police officers trained to provide active-shooter training to other police officers and the frequency of training police are doing to be better prepared to respond to active-shooter situations in the schools and the variables that may have an effect on the training, consideration should be given to theory and research in the field of study. Theories of organizational structures, goals, and planning are part of the theoretical framework for the present study.

Organizations are designed to achieve established goals and objectives; increase efficiency and enhance performance through specialization and division of labor; and coordination and control ensure diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh, through the use of structure (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Therefore, when police agencies establish a structured environment where training, planning and goal setting are stressed the result is better preparation for critical incident response.

At the foundation of the present study is the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations. In this standardization policy, the appropriate

response strategy involves immediate action and quick deployment by patrol forces to stop deadly actions of criminal actor[s]. For police to delay deployment under these circumstances may result in additional death or serious injuries (BCPO, 2005).

Summary

Parents and citizens are entitled to have their police agencies, at the municipal, county, state and federal levels make adaptations to do more to enhance their quality of life. To accomplish this, these agencies must work hard to prepare for events that have become all too common in our society. School violence, work place shootings and potential terrorist activity on US soil is now more than ever a reality.

School safety training and critical-incident drills have become mandated in New Jersey and other states. As much as had been done to prevent fire deaths in schools, needs to be done to prevent death at the hands of a violent adult or student in a school. With fire sprinklers and alarms in every school, and fire drills and evacuation routes preplanned, the likelihood of a student dying in a fire in a school in the US is minimal at best. In fact, no child has died in a fire in the last 25 years in an American school. However in the school year 2004/2005, 48 people were killed at the hands of a violent aggressor in schools (Fairburn & Grossman, 2000).

Training and safety have a long way to go toward prevention of these types of incidents. In the mean time there has to be more done for police to be able to effectively minimize the causalities in our nation's schools. School administrators are more alert and aware of potential problem students. Schools are being equipped with surveillance devices to protect the potential victims contained therein. More needs to be done to

prepare for the most likely threat that may come to those in the building. To prepare for the violent people who are allowed access to the facility.

This has to come from the police and their stepped up efforts of training and planning for potential attack. With the initiation of tactics such as active-shooter training and all of its kind, there needs to be a follow through. This will come at the hands of forward thinking police executives that realize that there is a need for getting their officers into schools to become more familiar with the interior layouts of the buildings. Executives that understand that the officers that are assigned to schools in the capacity of the SRO, are truly the best qualified to thwart or fend off an attack on the school. Police executives must understand that the time of setting up and waiting for S.W.A.T. is no longer an option. They need to realize that all of their police officers must be tactically trained to be able to make a difference. They need to act in spite of any lack of help by school administrators.

In 2004, a Columbus, Ohio police officer had stopped a deadly attack at a night club concert. A gunman had entered the club and killed a band member on stage while he was performing. An alert police officer trained in QUAD, (the Ohio version of active-shooter training) entered the night club, encountered the suspect and shot him dead, stopping the shooter's deadly assault before any more lives had been taken (Marx & Mayhood).

In 2005 in Red Lake, Minnesota a 16 year old student killed a grandparent and the grandparent's companion. The student went to his high school and shot a teacher, a security guard, and five other students before killing himself. The Red Lake Police Department had prepared for an event like this and trained for it at the school. They

relied on their training and made immediate entry into the school (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). Their response time and school entry was 2 minutes. The police officers found, confronted, shot, and wounded the violent student who then retreated into a classroom and killed himself (Freed, 2005). Their training had paid off. Although innocent lives had been lost, many more people could have been killed without the immediate response by the police.

These two incidents have shown that rapid police response to a scene and immediate police action will save lives. Violence can happen anywhere and if the police have not prepared for it there is the potential for many lives to be lost.

This researcher believes plans need to be developed now for all facets of these critical incidents. Road closure plans, staging areas, triage locations, debriefing sites, contact lists and the like. During the mayhem of these encounters there is too much to do to just wing it. Responses may need to be to a degree scripted to get as much essential work done with a minimum level of thinking about the various contacts that may need to be made. If a response plan exists some things on scene can become automatic and more attention can be focused on other areas of concern that may need more attention.

Chapter II has presented a review of pertinent literature, research and theory which contained; an introduction, background, a historical summary of events, traditional police tactics, legal mandates for change, new police tactics, problems with the new tactics, related research and theory to police administrators, school violence, a theoretical framework, and a summary. Chapter III will include a description of the design and methods of the study by discussing; purpose, design, population, methods, instrumentation, and a conclusion.

Chapter III

DESIGN AND METHODS

Purpose

This chapter provides an overview of purpose, design, methods, population, instrumentation, and conclusion. The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is mandatory for the children of Bergen County, New Jersey it becomes imperative that the municipal police departments of the county are able to provide a safe learning environment while children are in attendance. Bergen County has 68 municipal police departments that were included as participants in the study. The researcher obtained a complete list of municipal police departments in Bergen County on the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office website, www.bcpo.net, then added the number of police officers employed by each municipality with information derived from the FBI's 2006 Uniform Crime Report, New Jersey full-time law enforcement employees (see Appendix B).

The researcher was guided by the following questions:

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

Question 2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the *Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations* model policy?

Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

Because there is relatively little research in the field of police tactics and only some theory, most of which is concerned with the psychological characteristics of the actor[s], the researcher relied heavily on related literature and the descriptions of prior events. The study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy and only now has begun to be seriously studied and therefore, there is a lack of information available on police training (O'Brien, 2008a). The importance of this study is based in the knowledge of "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p. 13).

Design

A survey instrument was assembled to gather information in several topic areas: descriptive information, personnel, operations, specialized units, emergency preparedness for Active-Shooter / Critical Incident response, equipment, and policies and procedures. Six of the eight sections of the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey were borrowed with permission (see Appendix C). The survey instrument then comprised of 58 questions which were assembled to gather descriptive information. A total of 51 questions were borrowed from the LEMAS survey instrument and 7 original

questions designed by the researcher. Permission was granted via telephonic and email contact with Dr. Brian Reaves, the lead statistical administrator of the survey for the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Specifically, Dr. Reaves stated in an email correspondence that permission was granted to use certain questions from the original LEMAS survey tool. The original survey instrument was not a copy-written document and was therefore public domain. However, a request was made from Dr. Reaves that the Bureau of Justice Statistics not be mentioned in the new survey instrument: a request which was honored by the researcher.

A pilot study was then conducted to determine face validity of the survey instrument. Some comments received from the respondents of the pilot study included that the survey was lengthy and time consuming. See the instrumentation section of this chapter for more information on the results of the pilot study and specific comments made by the participants for the revision of the survey instrument.

As a result of the feedback generously provided by the participants of the pilot study of this project, a total of four questions were used from the original LEMAS survey instrument. Questions originally designed to gather information about the number of full time police officers working for a law enforcement agency, total dollar amount in operating budget of the agency, total dollar amount in seized funds made by the agency, and total calls for service responded to by the agency. All questions were based on the 2007 calendar year, the last complete year of operation of the agency prior to this study taking place. After further review of the research tool, the researcher realized the survey tool distributed in the pilot study gathered a large amount of information that shared little

relevance to this research project. Several of the topic areas previously mentioned were deleted to comply with the suggestions of the participants of the pilot study.

The remaining eight questions included in the revised survey instrument for this research project were developed by the researcher in conjunction with a jury of experts. The final survey instrument used in this study comprised of 11 questions (see Appendix D). These questions were specifically tailored to provide answers to the guiding questions of this research project.

The present study is a type 2 design, that Johnson (2001) calls a cross-sectional, descriptive study. It is cross-sectional because the data are collected from participants at a single point in time. According to Johnson (2001), if the researcher is describing phenomenon and documenting the characteristics of phenomenon then the study is descriptive non-experimental research. The data directly apply to each case at a single time and comparisons are made across the variables of interest (Johnson, 2001, p. 9). The present study sought to answer the following questions:

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the *Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations* model policy? Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train

others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

This study can be described as a cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental research by the use of the Johnson (2001) descriptions. According to Witte and Witte (2004) the present study collected qualitative data because when a single observation is a word or a code that is representative of a class or category, the data are qualitative. Witte and Witte (2004) also suggest that descriptive statistics such as tables, graphs and averages can be used to organize and summarize information about a collection of observations. The researcher proposed to use descriptive statistical methods to address guiding questions one and two of this project. Through the use of frequency distributions the researcher addressed the data gathered from the survey instrument to answer the guiding questions.

To answer guiding question 3 the researcher used the Chi-Squared ($\chi 2$) statistical method. Analyses were then conducted to determine what relationship the independent or predictor variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn law enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007) had on each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted).

Methods

This study relied solely on self reported data by agents of police departments. According to Kerlinger (1986) "It can even be said that non-experimental research is more important than experimental research..." (p. 359). Gall, Borg, and Gall (1996) stated causal – comparative methods are the easiest quantitative approach to looking into

cause and effect relationships between phenomena. One of the objectives of this study was to find which of the independent variables discovered in the survey instrument had the most effect on the type and frequency of training being done in municipal police departments of Bergen County. Because all of the 68 municipal police departments in the county were included in the study it was considered a census. The researcher proposed to have all 68 of the municipal police departments existing in Bergen County, NJ participate in the study. A letter asking for permission to send each of the police agencies a survey was sent to the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. The researcher received a letter from the prosecutor's office granting permission to send the survey to the municipal police agencies (see Appendix C). In the permission letter was a request for the researcher to share the findings of this project with the prosecutor's office. Furthermore, in a follow up phone conversation the researcher had with First Assistant Prosecutor William Galda, it was made known that this research project stimulated interest in a topic that had been put aside for a period while other important topics were being handled. The project served as a catalyst for the prosecutor's office to look into all the policies that municipal police agencies had submitted since the distribution of the training memo at the foundation of this study. This leads the researcher to conclude that prior to any data collection this research project has been a useful tool in reigniting interest in an area that may have been forgotten.

The rationale for soliciting participation from each of the municipal police departments in the county is in the similarities and differences of the police departments. Responses to the survey instrument from police departments of varying staffing levels, economic prowess, and setting (urban / suburban) will paint a more accurate picture of

what training is occurring within the county in the realm of active-shooter response. The primary objective of this study was to determine what influence the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in their jurisdictions. Each identified municipal police department in the county was sent a survey instrument (N=68) along with completion instructions and a cover letter requesting the Chief of Police, civilian Police Director or their designee complete and return the survey to the researcher.

The final survey instrument comprised of 11 fact based questions was sent to a jury of experts in the field. The experts agreed that the survey was easy to understand, easy to complete, and took very little time to locate the information to answer the questions. The original questions borrowed from the LEMAS survey come with a reported 90% reliability estimate as provided by the lead statistician for the survey, Dr. Reaves of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The LEMAS survey is distributed to police agencies across the United States every three years and has been determined to be both a valid and reliable tool.

All information being requested by the survey is accessible to the researcher through the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), however it is the contention of the researcher that in the form of a survey instrument the most current and accurate data will be collected which will make the resulting information more timely and relevant. If the researcher were to request all information being sought in this study through OPRA the information gathered may not be the most current as record updating is not a daily

occurrence in governmental agencies, and this process would add a significant amount of time to the project as well.

Once the voluntary participant police agencies return the surveys to the researcher a Cronbach's Alpha test will be conducted to determine a reliability coefficient. Cronbach's Alpha is a test reliability technique to provide a unique estimate of the reliability for a given test (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). This will be reported in more detail in chapter IV.

Prior to mailing the surveys, they will be coded with a control number known only to the researcher to track the responses as they are returned. No questions will be asked to specifically identify any agency based on the responses provided by the participants. No personal or identifying information will be asked of the person or representative of the police agency that has completed the survey. This is another layer of anonymity built in to the present study. All surveys as they are returned to the researcher will be stored in a locked fire resistant safe in the home of the researcher to maintain the security of the data. This information will be maintained for a period of no less than three years. The survey is also completely voluntary in nature. The study was approved by the Seton Hall University Institutional Review board on December 17, 2008 (see Appendix C).

Population

All of the police agencies used in this study are located in Bergen County, NJ, and each falls under the direction of the Bergen County Prosecutor's office jurisdiction. There are a total of 68 municipal police departments included in the study. Some of the distinctions of the police agencies are: number of sworn officers, square mileage

patrolled by the agency, equipment, and specialized services available by the agency. Police departments were approved to participate in this study through a permission letter approved by the Bergen County Prosecutor, John L. Molinelli. Police departments were then sent a cover letter with an explanation of the study and survey instrument to complete and return to the researcher.

Instrumentation

The LEMAS survey instrument was adapted to the specific needs of this research project. Wording of selected questions was changed to reflect the timeframe under study. Section V community policing and section VI emergency preparedness which is specific to terrorist activity were not used. A new section V with original questions formulated by the researcher along with a jury of experts in the field of policing, emergency management, and tactics was substituted to help the researcher answer the guiding questions of this research project. The researcher developed questions which replaced the original section V of the study and sent them electronically to Dr. David Klinger of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Department of The University of Missouri – St. Louis; Dr. Stephen Hoptay, Lieutenant with the New Jersey State Police, Office of Emergency Management, Special Operations Section; Dr. Daniel Simone, Captain with the Hoboken (NJ) Police Department; Sergeant David Champerlain of the Modesto (CA) Police Department, Special Victims Unit; and John Gnagey, Executive Director of the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) for feedback. With feedback and expert advice from the aforementioned experts in the field, questions were developed and accepted for use in the study.

A pilot study was then conducted on August 1, 2008 with the survey instrument in three municipalities in New Jersey that are in neighboring counties to Bergen; Morris and Passaic. In Passaic County the researcher contacted Chief Joseph Borell of the Bloomingdale Police Department, and Lt. Paul Dring of the Wayne Police Department. In Morris County the researcher contacted Chief Brian Spring of the Pequannock Police Department. The aforementioned police departments were selected for the pilot study for two reasons; (a) they are in neighboring counties to Bergen, (b) they are a representative sample of the number of police officers in municipal police departments in Bergen County. The Bloomingdale Police Department has 16 full-time police officers, Pequannock has 30, and Wayne has 116. These numbers are very similar to the Bergen County staffing levels for small, medium and larger sized agencies listed in the 2006 FBI Uniform Crime Report (FBI, 2006).

Each of these police administrators was provided with the survey instrument and asked to complete it using the attached directions. They were then asked to contact the researcher via email as soon as it was completed to provide constructive feedback and make any necessary revisions or recommendations to make the survey instrument stronger. The pilot study was conducted from August 1, 2008 to August 6, 2008.

Chief Borell suggested that the overall appearance of the survey seemed a bit cluttered and lengthy. Once the Chief began to work on the study, the cluttered feeling disappeared and the ease of the survey questions became apparent. A comment was forwarded that the survey seemed a bit too long, with 58 total questions. The Chief stated the survey instrument was well written and it was clear to the reader what was being asked. Chief Borell stated the survey took an estimated 45 to 50 minutes to complete.

Chief Borell suggested shortening the survey to include only the information that was most necessary for the study. With a completion time estimated at approximately 60 minutes, the survey taker may lose interest. Chief Borell made one last comment that was especially important; the survey should be completed by an agency head. The necessity of this was born out the type of information being sought, that is budget items, training hours, and salaries.

Lt. Dring also suggested the survey be completed by a member of the police department's administrative staff, in the Lieutenant's words, "upper command staff". The Lieutenant cited some of same the reasons Chief Borell did for this need. Lt. Dring stated the survey took approximately 60 to 90 minutes to complete which was even longer than the time taken by Chief Borell. This estimation was closer to the latter due to making several in-house phone calls to gather information that was not immediately available to the Lieutenant. Lt. Dring also recommended the survey be shortened to maintain the interest of the participant.

Chief Spring estimated the completion time for the survey at about 90 minutes. This was consistent with the prior two responses. Chief Spring did not feel as though any one question was too difficult to answer, and that they were all very clear in what they were asking. Chief Spring's final comment about the questionnaire was that no revisions were necessary and all of the questions were clear, concise and relevant but the survey took a substantial amount of time to complete.

The time to complete the survey was estimated at approximately 60 to 90 minutes by each of the pilot study participants. This was a duration which seemed to be too long for each of the participants. Each participant in the pilot study did recommend that an

upper level or command staff member such as the Chief or top administrator complete the survey as they would have the easiest access to the information requested. The result of the pilot test was that significant revisions were made.

The survey was pared down from 58 questions to 11 in total. The 11 total questions were those that would specifically be used to answer the guiding questions of this research project. The new survey instrument was then sent to four new participants that agreed to answer the survey and provide feedback. The information gathered from the new participants, all administrative level police officers; was that the survey was well written, the questions were clear and concise, the survey took about 10 to 15 minutes to complete, and the survey should not be an imposition on a police administrator to participate in the study due to the ease of the completion of the survey instrument.

The final survey instrument coded with a control number was mailed along with a cover letter of explanation, and a self addressed stamped envelope to facilitate a more likely return mailing of the completed survey to the researcher. The researcher mailed the surveys on December 18, 2008 and asked the participants to return the 11 question survey by January 7, 2009. The researcher allowed a third week for any late mailings before beginning any statistical processes.

By using frequency distributions the researcher will demonstrate to the reader; how many police departments in Bergen County, NJ had an active-shooter response plan in effect prior the training mandate established by the county prosecutor's office, how many agencies share radio interoperability with neighboring and bordering jurisdictions since the training mandate, which kinds of equipment purchases were made by police departments to facilitate forced entry into structures since the mandate, what kind of

training is being done to practice for a future active-shooter event, how many officers have been trained to instruct other police officers in this type of response tactics, how often police are training for these kinds of events, how many police departments have adopted the model policy distributed by the county prosecutor's office or created their own policy and why. Then the information collected on the number of sworn police officers, total budget, total in seized funds, and number of calls for service will be used as variables in a Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analysis to see which has the most influence on the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools in Bergen County, NJ.

Conclusion

In Chapter III the researcher described the design and methods of the study by discussing; purpose, design, population, methods, and instrumentation. Chapter IV will present the collected data along with an analysis of the data collected by using frequency distributions and Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analyses to determine which variables have the most influence on Active-Shooter preparation being done by police departments in Bergen County, NJ.

Chapter IV

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Introduction

The researchers' purpose for conducting this non-experimental study was to investigate the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. The investigation was narrowly focused on answering the following guiding questions: Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the *Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations* model policy? Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

Collection of Data

Table 1 provides a list of events complied by the researcher that were carried out or planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack at Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police response to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to

intervene in the implementation of a planned attack. A review of Table 1 shows the absence of absolutes in the events. It is important to note that "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p. 13). Therefore, similar events need to be positioned together to be able to form a complete picture of what could happen at any time.

Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the example which occurred on October 4, 2002 in San Antonio, TX, describes a female actor. Most attacks occurred inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms; however, some occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The events took place in urban, suburban and rural settings across all socio-economic strata. Victims were teachers, students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors in the events ranged from children (6 years old) to adults.

For this study, a survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous flow of back and forth dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts until a final version was selected. This process was discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.

This final survey instrument, consisting of 11 questions, was then distributed as a pilot study for feedback. After the determination that the final 11 question survey was to be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed with permission from the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. The mailings took place on December 18, 2008 and in the attached letter of solicitation it was requested that the voluntary participants return the survey to the

researcher by January 7, 2009 (see Appendix E). The researcher then allowed for another 7 days for returns to account for the large volume of mail during the holiday season.

In total 68 surveys were mailed on December 18, 2008, one to each of the 68 municipal police departments in Bergen County as listed on the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office website, www.bcpo.net. On the January 14, 2009 cut off date for returned surveys, 46 surveys were returned to the researcher resulting in a return rate of 68%. Of the 46 returned surveys, 1 was returned with all of the questions crossed out and no responses selected with a notation added which read "This causes me concerns on security issues." Therefore, all descriptive statistics and analyses are based on 45 returns (N = 45).

Data and Findings

Descriptive Statistics

Survey question 1a was designed to learn if, prior to the September 1, 2005 mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office for active-shooter response training, police agencies had a written plan that specified actions to be taken in the event of an active-shooter in a school. Table 3 indicates that slightly more than half of the responding police agencies did not have a written plan which specified response actions to an active-shooter situation in a school of their jurisdiction. Therefore, a mandate to either develop their own plan or adopt the response plan as distributed was a step in the right direction toward getting police departments in the country to plan for this type of critical incident response.

Table 3

Bergen County Police Departments with Response Plan Prior to Prosecutor's Office Training Mandate of September 1, 2005

Response	n	%
Yes	21	46.7
No	24	53.3
Total	45 (N)	100.

Survey question 1b provided information on the number of police departments (21) that indicated they did have a written response plan, and had a mutual aid or cooperative agreement between neighboring and or geographically bordering jurisdictions. Table 4 shows that of the 21 police departments that indicated they already had a response plan prior to the prosecutor's office mandate, 18 had an agreement with neighboring police departments for mutual aid responses. These results showed that administrators in police departments that did develop a response plan saw the need to work cooperatively with neighboring departments.

Table 4

Bergen County Police Departments with Existing Response Plans that have Mutual Aid Agreements for Joint Responses

Response	n	%
Yes	18	86.
No	3	14.
Total	21	100.

Survey question 2 was developed to find out if respondents had, after the September 1, 2005 training mandate, radio communications interoperability with geographically bordering jurisdictions. Table 5 shows that of the 43 responses to

question number 2, 40 police departments did have radio communication interoperability with geographically bordering jurisdictions. This is another success of the distributed response model policy. The response model policy created awareness for radio communications interoperability between agencies that will respond to a crisis together.

Table 5

Radio Communications Interoperability Between Neighboring Police Jurisdictions in Bergen County following Active-Shooter Planning

Response	n	%
Yes	40	93.
No	3	7.
Total	43	100.

Survey question 3 was created to find out what types of tactical response gear the police departments of Bergen County either purchased or acquired since the September 1, 2005 mandate. Table 6 indicates the types of response gear and the number of police departments reporting they acquired the respective items. The table shows that ballistic shields and carbine or patrol rifles were acquired more than other response gear items.

Table 6

Tactical Response Gear Acquired after Training Mandate of September 1, 2005 (N = 45)

Gear Item	Police Departments that Acquired Gear	
	n	%
Ballistic Helmets	34	76.
Ballistic Shields	42	93.
Battering Rams	19	42.
Bolt Cutters	29	64.
Carbine or Patrol Rifles	36	80.
Hallagan or Pry Bars	32	71.
Sledge Hammers	24	53.

Survey question 4 provided information on the types of training activities the respondent police departments participated in to prepare their officers better to respond to an active-shooter event in a school in their jurisdiction. Table 7 displays which types of training exercises and the number of agencies that participated in those exercises. The table includes percentages of Bergen County municipal police departments that participated at least once in each training category (multiple choices were possible). Of the various types of training listed, 39 police departments (87%) participated in active-shooter training in empty schools. This training is helpful for familiarization with response tactics and acclimation to the interior of schools. When police officers become familiar with the areas they may need to respond to in a crisis situation they may perform better under stressful conditions in those settings. The number of responses shows that, on average, responding police departments participated in 2.8 types of training.

Table 7

Training Exercises Participated in by Bergen County Police Departments for Active-Shooter Training (N = 45) Multiple Choices Possible.

Type of Training	Number of Police Departments	
	n	%
Table Top	15	33.
Multi-Dept. Table Top	9	20.
Training in Empty School	39	87.
Training in School w/ Actors	24	53.
Multi-Dept. Training in Empty School	26	58.
Multi-Dept. Training in School w/ Actors	15	33.
Total	128	-

Survey question 5 was created to learn from the responding police department administrators, the number of police officers in their agencies who were trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response. Table 8 reports the frequency

distribution of responses. Question 5 responses were then statistically collapsed into logical groupings for later statistical analysis. The collapse was done using natural and logical break points.

Table 8

Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response

Number of Officers Trained	n	%
0	2	4.4
1	1	2.3
2	16	35.5
3	13	28.8
4	8	17.7
5	2	4.4
6	1	2.3
7	1	2.3
20	1	2.3
Totals	45 (N)	100.

Table 9 displays the recoded data from survey question 5. Data recoding was done to logically develop the groupings into a *low number* of officers trained (0-2 officers), a *medium number* of officers trained (3 officers), and a *high number* of officers trained (more than 3 officers) to train other police officers in active-shooter response.

Table 9

Recoded responses: Police Departments Reporting the Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response

Officers Trained	n	%
Low Number of Officers Trained (0-2 Officers)	19	42.
Medium Number of Officers Trained (3 Officers)	13	29.
High Number of Officers Trained	13	29.
Total	45 (N)	100.

Table 8 shows one outlier police agency that reported 20 police officers trained to train other police officers, otherwise the scale of responses ranged from 0-7. Of the 45 police department administrators who responded to this question 29 (or 64%) reported that their agencies had either 2 or 3 officers trained to train other police officers in the active-shooter response tactics.

Survey question 6 was created to learn how often police administrators, since the September 1, 2005 training mandate, required their police officers to participate in training for active-shooter response whether it was practice scenarios, table-top exercises or roll-call discussions. These responses too were reported as frequencies then recoded and re-reported in statistically collapsed groups for later statistical analyses. These groups were also created using natural and logical break off points. Table 10 shows the frequency distribution of responses to the amount of training that is being done for municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As indicated in Table 10, of the 45 police department administrators that answered this survey question, 29 answered that they required their officers to participate in training either bi-annually or yearly.

Table 10

Frequency of Active-Shooter Training Required at Police Departments in Bergen County

Training Frequency	Agencies Reporting (n)	%
Monthly	5	11.1
Quarterly	9	20.
Bi-annually	10	22.2
Yearly	19	42.2
Never	2	4.5
Total	45 (N)	100.

Shown below, Table 11 reports the recoded responses from survey question 6 reported in Table 10. These responses were later used for statistical analyses.

Table 11.

Recoded responses, Amount of Required Training by Bergen County Police Departments

Training Frequency	Agencies Reporting (n)	%
Once a Quarter or Monthly	14	31.1
Bi-annually	10	22.2
Once a Year or Never	21	46.7
Total	45 (N)	100.

Survey question 7a provided information on whether or not police departments had adopted the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy and the reasons which led to the adoption. Table 12 lists the responses provided by agencies that did adopt the model policy.

Reoccurring themes developed from the responses provided for why agencies did adopt the model policy were either standardization, or having all police officers in the county being trained in the same tactics. Table 13 displays (question 7b responses) the reasons police administrators indicated why they did *not* elect to implement the BCPO policy as written.

Table 12

(7a) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for Adopting the BCPO Model Policy

Responses	n
Response checked but no comment added	2
Added agency specific material	1
Adopted their policies and created additional policies	1
All	1
All officers on same page	1
Allowed numerous agencies to utilize the response procedures with generic roles for each officer	1
Already studied and used	1
Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) policy was sufficient for our needs	1
Consistency through out area agencies	1
Everyone then operates the same	1
Felt BCPO policy worked best for our agency	1
Good S.O.P.	1
Helped develop the plan	1
It was deemed sufficient and appropriate	1
It was our intent to remain consistent with the agencies in Bergen County	1
It was very similar to our original policy and would prevent conflict	1
Policy fit our needs and was crafted by Bergen County Police Chief's Association	1
Policy was a good fit for our department	1
Presumably much time and effort and input was acquired to make the policy one of the best possible	1
Standard through the county	1
Standardization	1
Standardization with other agencies we would expect to work with	1
Standardized policy with contiguous police departments	1
The model policy allows us to be on same page as surrounding departments	1
The policy fit our requirements with minor modifications	1
To best conform with BCPO	1
To conform to standardized countywide training, realizing mutual aid would be necessary	1
To maintain uniformity with surrounding jurisdictions and county police	1
Took model and modified it to meet needs of our jurisdiction	1
We have the same training and procedures of the other agencies responding	1
We will provide the minimum mandated training to comply with the BCPO directives	1
Total	32

Table 13

(7b) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for not Adopting the BCPO Model Policy

Responses	n
Response checked but no comment listed	1
BCPO policy allows for 3 person teams, we mandate minimum of 4 person teams	1
BCPO policy and added National Tactical Officers Assoc. (NTOA) techniques	1
Created from other agencies models but similar to BCPO policy	1
Formulated to borough schools, used several parts of BCPO policy	1
Had a similar policy in place	1
Had standard NTOA policy in effect prior to BCPO policy	1
In effect prior to BCPO mandate, covers all relevant training equipment etc…	1
To better our own immediate needs	1
To conform to the department size and availability	1
Total	10

Although the responses in Table 13 were provided as reasons why agencies did not adopt the model policy, most respondents indicated their original policy was as least similar to the BCPO model policy or they used parts of the model policy to form their own.

Survey question 8 was developed to learn the number of sworn, full-time police officers in the police departments of Bergen County, NJ. Table 14 shows the number of sworn police officers and the frequency of agencies reporting that number of personnel.

Table 14

Number and Frequency of Police Officers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ.

Police Officers	n	%
12	2	4.5
13	4	8.9
15	3	6.7
16	1	2.2
17	1	2.2
18	5	11.1
20	4	8.9
21	1	2.2
22	5	11.1
24	1	2.2
26	1	2.2
28	1	2.2
31	3	6.7
32	2	4.5
37	2	4.5
43	1	2.2
44	1	2.2
45	1	2.2
46	1	2.2
48	1	2.2
50	1	2.2
63	1	2.2
65	1	2.2
109	1	2.2
Total	45 (N)	100.

Table 15 shows the responses listed in Table 14 which were derived from survey question 8 that have been recoded for statistical analyses. Recoding was done using a statistical collapse with natural and logical break points to create a grouping system of a *small number* of police officers (1-20), *medium number* (21-30) and *large number* (31 or more). Recoded responses were used for later statistical analyses.

Table 15

Recoded Responses: Number and Frequency of Full-Time Police Officers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ.

Number of Police	n	%
Small Number (1-20 Full-time Police Officers)	20	44.4
Medium Number (21-30 Full-time Police Officers)	9	20.0
Large Number (31 or More Full-time Police Officers)	16	35.6
Total	45 (N)	100.

Survey question 9 provided information on the (2007) operating budgets in U.S. dollars of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. Given that each of the police departments surveyed listed a different dollar amount, only the recoded data were reported in the current study. Original data were collapsed into *low total* operating budget ($0.00 - $250,000.00), *medium total* ($250,000.00 - $3,000,000.00), and *high total* ($3,000,001.00 or more).

Of the 45 responding police administrators 40 (89%) answered survey question 9. Of the 40 responses, 31 (78%) of the operating budgets were in the low and medium ranges. This represents almost 78 % of the responses. Only nine of the agencies reported having a budget in the high range of $3,000,001.00 or more, representing approximately 22.5 % of the responses. Table 16 shows the recoded data from survey question 9.

Table 16

Recoded Responses: Total (2007) Operating Budgets of Police Departments in Bergen County, NJ

Police Operating Budgets	n	%
Low Total Operating Budget ($0.00 to $250,000.00)	19	47.5
Medium Total Operating Budget ($250,001.00 to $3,000,000.00)	12	30.0
High Total Operating Budget ($3,000,001.00 or more)	9	22.5
Total	40	100.

* no response n = 5

Survey question 10 was designed to learn the amounts in U.S. dollars that each municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ reported in asset forfeiture funds in the year 2007. The year 2007 was selected because it was the last complete year prior to this study being conducted. Agency administrator who responded to this survey question listed varying amounts that were specific to their agencies only. For that reason, the responses were collapsed into manageable categories using natural and logical break points.

The categories used were *low* forfeiture program ($0.00 - $200.00), *medium* forfeiture program ($201.00 - $10,000.00) and *high* forfeiture program ($10,000.00 or more). Table 17 shows the response to survey question 10. Of the 45 responding agencies, 44 (98%) provided data.

Table 17

Recoded Responses: 2007 Forfeiture Program, Seized Funds as Reported by Police Departments in Bergen County, NJ

Forfeiture Category	n	%
Low Forfeiture Program ($0.00 - $200.00)	17	38.64
Medium Forfeiture Program ($201.00 - $10,000.00)	13	29.55
High Forfeiture Program ($10,001.00 or more)	14	31.81
Total	44	100.

Survey question 11 was created to determine the number of calls for service that each municipal police agency reported they had received or responded to in 2007. For reporting purposes each of the agencies reported a different total of calls for service. These numbers were broken into workable categories, again using a statistical collapse based on natural and logical break off points. These new categories were *low* annual service calls (0-10,000), *medium* annual service calls (10,001-15,000) and *high* annual service calls (15,001 or more). Table 18 shows the recoded data only for responses to survey question 11.

Table 18

Recoded Responses: 2007 Annual Service Calls as Reported by Police Departments in Bergen County, NJ

Service Calls	n	%
Low Annual Service Calls (0-10,000)	21	46.6
Medium Annual Service Calls (10,001-15,000)	12	26.7
High Annual Service Calls (15,001 or more)	12	26.7
Total	45 (N)	100.

Reliability Estimates

After the completed surveys were returned to the researcher and the descriptive statistics were derived from them, a Cronbach's Alpha test was used to determine a reliability coefficient for responses to survey questions 8, 9, 10 and 11. The questions were grouped to perform the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem (2003) single-item reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach's Alpha was .75. Cronbach's alpha reliability estimate normally ranges between 0 and 1. Although there actually is no lower limit to the coefficient, the closer Cronbach's Alpha coefficient is to 1.0, the greater the internal consistency of the items in the scale (Gliem & Gliem, 2003).

George and Mallery (2003) provided the following rules of thumb in reference to Cronbach's Alpha scores: "_ > .9 – Excellent, _ > .8 – Good, _ > .7 – Acceptable, _ > .6 – Questionable, _ > .5 – Poor, and < .5 – Unacceptable" (p. 231). Thus, for the current work, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable.

Answering Research Question 1

Research question 1 asked how have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

Descriptive statistics reported earlier in this chapter have shown that training efforts have changed for police preparedness to respond to active-shooter situations in schools to create safer learning environments since the September 1, 2005 training mandate, in the amount of training required by police department administrators. Of the 45 surveys returned to the researcher with survey question 6 answered, 43 (96%) indicated that the police agency required training in active-shooter response either monthly, quarterly, bi-annually or yearly. Only 2 of the 45 reporting agencies responded that it was never required to train in these response tactics.

Research question 1(a) asked how training efforts are exposing officers to realistic environments. This was answered by survey question 4. Of the 45 responding police department administrators 39 (87%) indicated that their officers had participated in training in empty schools. This type of training is realistic as it is places officers into a real setting and creates familiarity for the police officers for responses during emergency conditions.

Question 1(b) asked how police departments have augmented response capabilities. Survey question 3 was designed to answer this question. It was learned that

42 of the 45 responding police department administrators indicated that their agency had purchased ballistic shields to augment their officers' response to a critical incident of this sort. Thirty six of the 45 responding agencies reported their agencies had purchased carbine or patrol rifles to further enhance response capabilities. At a reduced percentage agencies reported purchasing other equipment items such as; ballistic helmets, battering rams, bolt cutters, Hallagan or pry bars, and sledge hammers.

Answering Research Question 2

Research question 2 was also answered using descriptive statistics. The question asked why are police departments implementing or not implementing the *Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations* model policy? This question was answered by responses to survey question 7. Reoccurring themes developed from the responses showed why agencies adopted the model policy: (a) standardization or (b) having all police officers trained in the same tactics. It is apparent that police department administrators are aware of the importance of having standard practices that all officers can be taught. The reality of a critical incident is that neighboring jurisdictions will also respond to supplement the response capability of the municipality suffering the crisis. The additional responding officers need to know the same fundamental tactics the officers in the jurisdiction in crisis know. In this respect police officers from various municipalities can form ad hoc teams to respond to the crisis appropriately.

Reasons stated for not adopting the model policy as distributed were that police departments already had a similar policy in place prior to the distribution of the model policy. Other agencies created similar policies that were more specifically tailored to the

need of their specific jurisdiction. And lastly others stated they used parts of the model policy to develop their own policy.

Answering Research Question 3

To answer research question 3 the researcher used Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analyses to determine which factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools (see Appendix F).

After recoding all data in the responses to survey questions 8, 9, 10, and 11 into three categories, those responses were independent variables for Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analyses. The responses to survey questions 5 and 6 were also recoded to provide the researcher with dependant variables for analysis. According to Witte and Witte (2004) an independent variable is manipulated by the investigator, and a dependant variable is measured, counted, or recorded by the investigator.

In the first statistical analysis completed, the number of sworn full time police officers was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. The Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analysis results indicated a value of 2.47 ($df = 4$) and a p value of (sig.) .650 (no statistical significance). In other words, the number of full-time sworn police officers in a municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect on the number of police officers in the agency that are trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the second statistical analysis completed, the total operating budget of a police department was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. A Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analysis indicated a value of 2.72 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) .604 (no statistical significance). Results show that the total operating budget of a municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect on the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the third statistical analysis completed, the number in U.S. dollars in forfeiture funds reported from municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ for the year 2007 was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a dependant variable. The Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analysis results were statistically significant, unlike the other two analyses. Results indicated a value of 17.68 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) .001. In much social science research, statistical significance is indicated at $p \leq .05$, so .001 indicates statistical significance (Witte & Witte, 2004).

It appears that the amount of dollars reported by the police agencies in asset forfeiture influences the number of police officers the agency has trained to train other police in active-shooter response tactics: This seized money seems to be used for additional police training. As is normally the case in asset forfeiture at the municipal police level, seized money is maintained in an account by the county prosecutor's office for approved usage by the municipal police department. This money can be approved by the county prosecutor's office to be allocated for items and expenditures outside the normal operating budget of the agency. Training typically falls under this realm. Based

on this finding one can assume that training in municipal police departments may be paid for by seized forfeiture funds.

In the fourth statistical analysis completed, the number of annual service calls for the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a dependant variable. Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analysis results indicated a value of .868 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) .929 (no statistical significance). The number of calls for service in 2007 had no effect on the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the fifth statistical analysis, the number of sworn full-time police officers was used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter tactics was used as the dependent variable. The Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analysis indicated a value of 7.38 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) .117 (no statistical significance). The p value indicated a lack of statistical significance. The number of full-time sworn police officers had no effect on the amount of required training in active-shooter response tactics.

In the sixth statistical analysis, the total operating budget of a police department was used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter tactics was used for the dependent variable. The Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analysis indicated a value of 11.95 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) .018 which was statistically significant. Again, the result of the statistical analysis is showing a relationship between available money and training. There appears to be a relationship between the total

operating budget and the amount of training being done by police officers in active-shooter response tactics in Bergen County, NJ.

In the seventh statistical analysis, the amount of dollars reported by the police agencies in asset forfeiture was used as the independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter tactics used for the dependent variable. The Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analysis indicated a value of 5.36 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) .252 (no statistical significance). The statistical analysis showed that there is no relationship between the amount of dollars in forfeiture funds reported and the amount of required training in active-shooter response tactics.

In the eighth and final statistical analysis, the number of calls for service reported for the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter response tactics was used as the dependant variable. The Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analysis indicated a value of 8.93 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) .063 (no statistical significance). However, the p value being within .013 of an indication of statistical significance does warrant some explanation. It appeared that although there is not a statistically significant relationship between the number of calls for service reported by police officers and the amount of active-shooter tactics training being required it does seem that a relationship on some level does exist. The number of calls for service does seem to have a relationship at some level to the amount of training being done. Busier police departments are going to be less available to do as much training as those that are not as busy. If the number of calls for service is greater in one agency, their officers are needed to respond to calls for service and would be unable to become unavailable to participate in training.

Summary

In Chapter IV, the researcher used several sections such as an introduction, collection of data, data and findings, descriptive statistics, reliability, answering research question 1, answering research question 2, answering research question 3 to present information. The reported descriptive statistics learned from the survey instrument that had been distributed to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ presented an interesting look at the types of equipment purchases, training being done and policy changes made as a result of the distribution of the model policy discussed throughout.

The researcher also reported on the Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) statistical analyses done to determine any relationships between the indicated dependant and independent variables of this study. Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first was between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount of training being done in active-shooter response tactics.

Chapter V will include an introduction, summary of findings, discussion, conclusions, recommendations for policies and practices, and future study.

Chapter V

INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICIES AND PRACTICES, AND FUTURE STUDY

Introduction

This study was developed from the personal interest of the researcher in police tactics to respond to active-shooter situations. In beginning the study, the researcher determined that the focus would be on municipal police departments of Bergen County, NJ. In 2008 the researcher was a police supervisor in a municipal police department in Bergen County and in this capacity was responsible to train other police officers in these tactics.

The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is mandatory for the children to age 16 in Bergen County, New Jersey the municipal police departments of the county must provide a safe learning environment while children are in attendance.

The researcher sought a suitable survey instrument designed to gather appropriate information to answer the research questions at the foundation of the study. These research questions were:

1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office (BCPO)? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the *Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations* model policy?

3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

The researcher located the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (USDOJ), Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey instrument. With permission from the USDOJ, the LEMAS survey instrument was amended and the questions specifically tailored for the needs of the current study. A revised survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous flow of dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts. The survey instrument consisted of 11 questions and was redistributed as a pilot study for feedback, as was reported in chapter III in greater detail. After the determination that the final 11 question survey was to be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. The mailing took place on December 18, 2008 and in the attached letter of solicitation it was requested that the voluntary participants return the survey to the researcher by January 7, 2009. Through the use of the survey the guiding questions were then answered in chapter IV.

Summary of Findings

The descriptive statistics from the present study developed a picture of what has been done by police agencies in Bergen County to prepare for an active-shooter event in a school. Prior to the distribution of the model policy more than 50% of the police departments in Bergen County did not have any type of plan in effect for dealing with this type of crisis in a school. This policy then forced the remaining police agencies to either adopt the distributed model policy or develop their own plan for implementation.

Through this study it was also learned that 86% of the agencies that already had response plans prior to the distribution of the model policy, had also included a mutual aid plan to get assistance from neighboring jurisdictions when the crisis occurred. This is a clear example of forward thinking on the part of the administrators.

In addition, the respondent police agencies also understood the importance of radio communications interoperability with the neighboring jurisdictions. This was evidenced by 93% of the police departments creating radio communications interoperability with neighboring agencies as a result of the distributed model policy. This allows for multiple jurisdictions to communicate with one another on the same radio frequency to provide for faster and more direct radio communications.

This study shed light on the types of equipment police departments made as a result of the model policy distribution. It was indicated that 93% of the agencies that responded reported purchasing ballistic shields, 80% purchased carbine or patrol rifles, and 76% reported purchasing ballistic helmets.

As for training, 87% of the police departments reported training in empty schools in their jurisdictions. This creates familiarization with the interior and exterior of the schools which could make the difference of saving a life during a crisis situation.

Sadly, only 20% of the police departments reported training as being mandatory on a quarterly basis, 22.2% on a bi-annual basis, and still only 42% required training on a yearly basis. This is simply not enough to get good at tactics. At best once or twice a year can only help to refresh your tactics. It is hardly enough to make improvements and become skilled in what is being taught and trained.

A Cronbach's Alpha test was used to determine a reliability coefficient for responses to survey questions 8, 9, 10 and 11. The questions were grouped to perform the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem (2003) single-item reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach's Alpha was .75. For the current study, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable.

The following relationships were determined to be lacking statistical significance: (a) the number of sworn full time police officers as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable, (b) the total operating budget of a police department as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable, (c) the number of annual service calls for the year 2007 as the independent variable and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics as a dependant variable, (d) the number of sworn full-time police officers as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter tactics as the dependent variable, (e) the amount of dollars reported by the police

agencies in asset forfeiture as the independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter tactics as the dependent variable, and (f) the number of calls for service reported for the year 2007 as the independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter response tactics as the dependant variable.

The present study also determined two statistically significant findings. The first of these findings was the relationship between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments in 2007 and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics. Based on results from this research, the more seizure funds available to police department administrators the more police officers in their agencies are being trained to train the other police officers in their respective police departments in active-shooter response tactics.

The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount of training being done in active-shooter response tactics. Both findings indicate that there is a direct relationship between available finances and training of police officers in active-shooter response tactics. Simply put, police departments with larger budgets and more available money are training more often than agencies with smaller budgets and less money available. Therefore the assumption can be made that the more money allocated toward training will better prepare police officers to be able to respond to and effectively deal with an active-shooter situation in a school.

Discussion

If Ouchi (1977) is correct in the assumption that structure influences behavior, the conclusion can be made that more training designed to train police officers to respond to active-shooter situations will create better prepared police. Mintzberg's (1979) theory of action planning accounts for how a job is done rather than specifically relying on the outcome of the operation. With this theory in mind the assertion can be made that when more police officers are designated to train others in essential response tactics then the responding police should be more likely to be successful in the completion of their mission, which is to save lives.

Scanlon (2001) described the premise of an active-shooter, who is seriously wounding and/or killing people, and the need for the first responding officers to make a rapid assessment of the incident and make entry to stop the suspect[s]. This ability to rapidly assess and form an ad hoc team is essential to properly ending these types of crisis situations. However, police departments in Bergen County are not devoting enough time, energy and resources to training toward this end and if the time comes when the tactics are needed there will be a break down in their capability to bring the situation to a quick resolution. There needs to be more frequent training.

Giduck (2005) recommended that police try to change their mindset from police officer dealing with a crime scene to a military unit dealing with a battlefield. If 42% of police departments are training but once a year in the necessary skills and tactics it would likely be an impossible task to effectively train to appropriately handle these situations as they may arise. Training once a year serves the officers more as a reminder of tactics rather than a training of learned skills. Training is a repetitive process where skills are

ingrained through repetition, practice, critique, and correction. Once a year is simply not enough for officers to become efficient in the necessary skills they will need to possess to work safely and swiftly to bring a conflict of this nature to an end.

Lloyd (2000) called it a moral obligation for police to make entry and intervene in an ongoing active-shooter situation. The purchases described in this study of tactical and entry equipment displays the commitment of Bergen County Police Departments toward this end. The entry equipment purchased offers the police the ability to make a forced entry to breach any location to quickly gain access and begin their mission. The tactical equipment is a testament to properly equipping the officers that will most certainly be placed in harms way to complete their mission. Although there is no specific recommendation on equipment purchases the more tools at the disposal of the police officers the easier it will be to do their job.

Coordination and control as presented by Bolman and Deal (2003) helps to ensure that diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh. This theory is the premise behind having a unified response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents. Through the use of structure, police officers from various agencies are able to work safely and effectively together. This goal is met by the establishment of the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy distributed by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. It seemed to be a priority of the police administrators when they indicated reasons why they adopted the model policy, that all police officers are aware of the same basic tactics. The reality is that multiple jurisdictions will respond to the same scene to assist in bringing the crisis to a resolution.

This can be done by training all police officers who may respond in the same tactics so each can work with any other.

Conclusions

It seems clear to the researcher that the police administrators that provided answers to the distributed survey questionnaire at the foundation of this study are quite aware of what needs to be done in the event of an active-shooter situation in a school of their jurisdiction. What seems to be lost is that these tactics when initially trained are perishable skills, and like anything else that is taught, it will go away when not properly reinforced. What is lacking in Bergen County is the correct measure of reinforcement of the tactics. Police officers are simply not training enough to become really prepared and efficient at the necessary skill sets to tackle the situations which have formed the basis of this study.

Numerous documents have been written based on research conducted on who commits these violent acts in our nation's schools. Klein (2005) asserted that popular discourse addressed school shootings almost obsessively, but continued to omit the role gender plays in these crimes. New research has suggested that this omission was ignoring a key element: a significant number of the boys' own stated reasons for this violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence specifically involving girls (Klein, 2005). This researcher has found that aside from a rare exception or two, predominately young white males from the ages 11 – 18 years old, mostly loners and with relatively easy access to firearms are the perpetrators (Scanlon, 2001). With the type of information collected by agencies like the FBI in their July, 1999 paper entitled "The school shooter: a threat assessment perspective" (O'Toole, 1999) and the International

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in their "Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence" retrieved from the IACP website in February 2007 (Kramen, Massey, & Timm, 1999), school officials have been preparing for violent students, with the assistance of their law enforcement partners. Identification of the potential offenders is the first step toward limiting this kind of behavior in the future. Prevention can come from close partnerships between law enforcement and schools in early detection of potential assaults as well as in sharing information about those identified as having the potential to be involved in this behavior. Sending better prepared police to respond to these crisis situations in the schools is a direct result of the amount of money that is being allotted for training.

For law enforcement personnel to take their tactics to the next level, they must begin now to prepare for future acts of school violence and/or terrorism. As a result of this research project the researcher now knows that the amount of funds allocated toward training is going to make the difference in sending better prepared police officers into a potential battle. No one thought it would have been possible for the acts of September 11, 2001 to have been perpetrated against the US, on US soil. After the events of 9/11/2001 occurred, the law enforcement community was left with the realization that the US was no longer immune from the acts of violence the rest of the world has had to endure for centuries. Future acts of active shooting in schools and terrorism are a reality and police officers must be prepared to face them.

Just as the law enforcement community has learned lessons from the Columbine High School tragedy, so too have the next wave of potential attackers and terrorists been planning their next attack. Through after action investigations, it is known that school

attackers and terrorists study police responses and know all about tactics the likes of active-shooter, QUAD, and IARD that have been discussed herein. US law enforcement must begin now to prepare for potential attacks by active-shooters and terrorists on our most precious targets, our children (Giduck, 2005). What could make American citizens feel more vulnerable than an attack at a school? Persons in other countries have been dealing with this reality for years and are prepared to handle situations like this at a school. Countries like Israel have placed armed guards on every school bus and in every school. School buses are armored to minimize potential injuries from an attack. School campuses are fortified territory (Giduck, 2005). Short of having armed guards on armored school buses and inside schools, more must be done to train police in response tactics. To accomplish this goal more money must be directed toward the training of tactics like those proposed in the Standardization of Patrol Based Response for Active-Shooter Situations.

Law enforcement policy makers need also to begin cooperative efforts with military units for training in handling battlefield type conflict, much like they would be facing in a terrorist attack on a school. Terrorism experts like Giduck who authored "Terror at Beslan" (2005) conclude that the terrorists will attack the US again. It is also likely that a potential target will be an unsuspecting school. The terrorists are not at all like the loner child who brings a gun to school. They come with tested and rehearsed battle plans, reinforcements, surveillance and counter surveillance measures in place (Giduck, 2005).

The terrorist's goal is not to be arrested or contained; it is to kill as many victims and police responders as possible to gain notoriety for their cause (Giduck, 2005). Our

future is now: Policing in the US must adapt now for the threats of the future which will most certainly be at the hands of terrorists who will, like they have in the past, attack when and where we are least expecting them to. That certainly could be a school. Law enforcement personnel need to make more adaptations to their training now to be able to respond to an event they will face (Giduck, 2005). With one hurdle cleared the next one is right in front of us.

Recommendations for Policies and Practices

Since police officers may face the need to respond to a critical incident (active-shooter situation) in the schools of their jurisdictions, the responsibility for training in response tactics becomes increasingly paramount. In that respect all responding police officers to an active-shooter situation, must at least be aware of the same tactics. In Bergen County, NJ this topic was addressed in 2005 when the prosecutor's office distributed a memo requiring a unified and consistent active-shooter response.

However, this researcher believes that more needs to be done than just blanket familiarization with a response policy. As was discovered in this research there is disparity in the amount and type of training being done. Not enough training is taking place to respond effectively to an active-shooter situation. More training needs to become the rule rather than the exception. If not enough training is being conducted, the training and interest will not be sustained. When times get really tough, in a critical situation the natural tendency is to revert to the original process of how things were done in the past (Palazzolo, 2009). Here, how things were done in the past simply will not be enough to save lives effectively.

Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy and some situations only now have begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of information available on police training for active-shooter situations (O'Brien, 2008a). The researcher located no research to determine what the best tactics are to respond to active-shooters in schools and the science of the study police tactics. Since no data are available to study to make a truly scientific determination to apply to policy the advice of the experts like Giduck must be followed. More training is certainly necessary to provide the community with a prepared and capable police department.

Based on the findings of this study more money and effort needs to be directed toward training budgets. Police departments with more funds available are doing more training. Since the critical incidents that may present themselves are not specific to jurisdictions with sufficient training budgets, funds must come from somewhere to prepare police to respond to crisis situations. If police departments are unable to fund their own training, a county-wide or state-wide training program should be available to police departments for continuous training.

The Bergen County Prosecutor's Office should establish and maintain a county-wide training division. One responsibility for this training division should be providing standard and mandatory continuing training to the police in the county in mutual aid and critical incident responses. The training should be provided at not cost to the local police departments of the county to ensure cost to the agency is not preventing officers from being trained in the most current tactics available.

Future Study

Numerous research projects and studies have been conducted on the topic of school violence prevention. But what happens when it happens? What about when the prevention efforts are not effective to stop the violence before it happens? There needs to be research on the best practices of police response tactics to school shooter situations. Special attention needs to be paid to the evolution of tactics and how they are changing based on prior responses and the successfulness of the police operations in those incidents. To accomplish this S.W.A.T. tactics should be studied to determine which, is the best fit to adapt to train to patrol officers.

More research needs to be done in the topic area of police training and the amount of funds required for that training to be successful. A comprehensive study needs to be conducted to determine the dollar amount that needs to be allocated per police officer to allow for similarly trained police in effective tactics. An in depth study should be focused on tactical equipment and which pieces are best for police to use during crisis situations.

There should be future studies done to determine what police officers in other counties in New Jersey are doing to prepare for these types of situations they may face in schools. There should also be a study done to compare what is being done from state to state and as a result try to determine which training is the most cost effective, the most beneficial and which fits best for patrol officers.

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Appendix A

BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

To: All Bergen County Chiefs and Directors of Police

From: Prosecutor John L. Molinelli

Subject: Directive 05-01 Active Shooter Policy Initiative

Date: April 11, 2005

Please be advised that, effective immediately, it shall be the policy of law enforcement in Bergen County that a unified and consistent active shooter policy exists and which shall apply to all sworn law enforcement officers responding to an Active Shooter situation within the County in accordance therewith. The form of the policy is as adopted by the Active Chiefs of the Bergen County Police Chiefs Association at its meeting of February 24, 2005, as shall be amended by the Chiefs' Association from time-to-time. The adoption of this policy shall contemplate requisite training to be implemented through the Bergen County Law and Public Safety Institute so that all law enforcement officers within the County are prepared to implement and follow such procedures on or before September 1, 2005.

This Directive shall also serve to acknowledge the hard work and effort the Mutual Aid and Special Operations Committee, Training and Education Committee of the Bergen County Police Chiefs' Association, whose work was instrumental in the formulation of this policy.

cc: Chief Michael Mordaga
First Assistant Prosecutor William J. Galda
Executive Assistant Prosecutor Frank Puccio

Appendix B

List of 68 Bergen County Municipal Police Departments

Agency	Number of officers	Agency	Number of officers
Allendale	14	Norwood	13
Alpine	12	Oakland	23
Bergenfield	46	Old Tappan	13
Bogota	15	Oradell	22
Carlstadt	31	Palisades Park	31
Cliffside Park	48	Paramus	91
Closter	23	Park Ridge	18
Cresskill	25	Ramsey	33
Demarest	14	Ridgefield	27
Dumont	33	Ridgefield Park	30
East Rutherford	34	Ridgewood	44
Edgewater	29	River Edge	22
Elmwood Park	46	River Vale	20
Emerson	18	Rochelle Park	21
Englewood	80	Rutherford	43
Englewood Cliffs	24	Saddle Brook	34
Fair Lawn	59	Saddle River	16
Fairview	31	South Hackensack	17
Fort Lee	106	Teaneck	100
Franklin Lakes	23	Tenafly	38
Garfield	61	Upper Saddle River	18
Glen Rock	21	Waldwick	20
Hackensack	112	Wallington	24
Harrington Park	12	Washington Township	24
Hasbrouck Heights	32	Westwood	26
Haworth	12	Wood-Ridge	22
Hillsdale	20	Woodcliff Lake	18
Ho-Ho-Kus	15	Wyckoff	26
Leonia	19		
Little Ferry	28		
Lodi	40		
Lyndhurst	49		
Mahwah	56		
Maywood	24		
Midland Park	13		
Montvale	22		
Moonachie	19		
New Milford	36		
North Arlington	32		
Northvale	14		

Appendix C

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Bureau of Justice Statistics

Washington, D.C. 20531

September 9, 2008

Jeff Dino
117 Knolls Road
Bloomingdale, NJ 07403

Dear Mr. Dino:

The purpose of this letter is to grant you permission to use a limited number of questi from the BJS Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey questionnaire for your study of police departments in Bergen County, New Jer This permission is granted for the purposes of the Bergen County data collection only and any future data collections based on the LEMAS survey instrument will also requ a request to BJS for permission to use the LEMAS questions. If any further informati is needed regarding this letter of permission, please contact me by email at <brian.reaves@usdoj.gov> or by phone at 202-616-3287.

Sincerely,

Brian A. Reaves

Brian A. Reaves, Ph.D.
LEMAS Program Manager
Bureau of Justice Statistics
U.S. Department of Justice

September 15, 2008

John L. Molinelli, Prosecutor
Bergen County Prosecutor's Office
10 Main Street
Hackensack, NJ 07601

Dear Prosecutor Molinelli,

My name is Jeffrey Dino. I am a 13 year veteran Police Sergeant with the Mahwah Police Department. I am also a doctoral candidate at Seton Hall University. I am preparing my dissertation on police preparedness to respond to active shooter situations in schools of Bergen County, NJ. The dissertation is focused on how the municipal police departments of Bergen County are preparing to respond to an active shooter situation since the distribution of your directive marked 05-01 Active Shooter Policy Initiative.

The purpose of this letter is to request your permission for me to send each of the 68 municipal police agencies of Bergen County a copy of a survey questionnaire to ask them to complete and return to me. The survey contains questions borrowed from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey and questions that were prepared with the assistance of a jury of experts in the fields of policing, police tactics, and emergency management.

This research study has been approved by Seton Hall University. All information gathered will be kept strictly confidential and no identifying characteristics of any agency will be asked for or disseminated.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for any and all consideration you give this request. If there are any questions I can be contacted anytime at 973-650-0565.

Respectfully,

Jeffrey Dino

L. MOLINELLI
County Prosecutor

Office of the County Prosecutor

County of Bergen

HACKENSACK, NEW JERSEY 07601
(201) 646-2300

WILLIAM J. GALDA
First Assistant Prosecutor

FRANK PUCCIO
Executive Assistant Prosecutor

JOHN L. HIGGINS, III
Trial Chief

Joseph Macellaro
Chief of Detectives

October 8, 2008

Mr. Jeffrey Dino
117 Knolls Road
Bloomingdale, NJ 07403

Re: Active Shooter Preparedness Survey

Dear Mr. Dino,

In regard to your request to send a questionnaire to the municipal police departments in Bergen County to assess how the departments are prepared to respond to an active shooter situation, that request, and the form proposed by you are approved. It is my understanding that you are sending out this questionnaire in furtherance of your doctoral degree at Seton Hall University. This office approves of the questionnaire that you wish to use, and also is interested in the results that will flow from the responses that you receive. Please provide this office with a summary of your findings, if possible. I commend you on your choice of topic, and wish you much success in your efforts to achieve your doctoral degree. If at any time I, or this office, can be of any further assistance to you please do not hesitate to contact me at 201-226-5104.

Very truly yours,

William J. Galda

William J. Galda
First Assistant Prosecutor

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF RESEARCH, DEMONSTRATION OR RELATED ACTIVITIES INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

All material must be typed.

PROJECT TITLE: A Study in Police Preparedness to Respond to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey.

CERTIFICATION STATEMENT:

In making this application, I(we) certify that I(we) have read and understand the University's policies and procedures governing research, development, and related activities involving human subjects. I (we) shall comply with the letter and spirit of those policies. I(we) further acknowledge my(our) obligation to (1) obtain written approval of significant deviations from the originally-approved protocol BEFORE making those deviations, and (2) report immediately all adverse effects of the study on the subjects to the Director of the Institutional Review Board, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ 07079.

Jeffrey Dino _____ 10/10/08
RESEARCHER(S) OR PROJECT DIRECTOR(S) DATE

**Please print or type out names of all researchers below signature.
Use separate sheet of paper, if necessary.**

My signature indicates that I have reviewed the attached materials and consider them to meet IRB standards.

Dr. Charles Achilles _____ 10/10/08
RESEARCHER'S ADVISOR OR DEPARTMENTAL SUPERVISOR DATE

Please print or type out name below signature

The request for approval submitted by the above researcher(s) was considered by the IRB for Research Involving Human Subjects Research ~~at the~~ in Dec 2008 ~~meeting~~.

The application was approved ✓ not approved ___ by the Committee. Special conditions were ___ were not ✓ set by the IRB. (Any special conditions are described on the reverse side.)

Mary F Pangelia, Ph. D _____ 12/17/08
DIRECTOR, DATE
SETON HALL UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARD FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH

OFFICE OF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
SETON HALL UNIVERSITY

December 17, 2008

Jeffrey Dino
117 Knolls Road
Bloomingdale, NJ 07403

Dear Mr. Dino,

The Seton Hall University Institutional Review Board has reviewed the information you have submitted addressing the concerns for your proposal entitled "A Study in Police Preparedness to Report to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey". Your research protocol is hereby approved as revised through expedited review. The IRB reserves the right to recall the proposal at any time for full review.

Enclosed for your records are the signed Request for Approval form, and the stamped Letter of Solicitation. Make copies only of this stamped letter.

The Institutional Review Board approval of your research is valid for a one-year period from the date of this letter. During this time, any changes to the research protocol must be reviewed and approved by the IRB prior to their implementation.

According to federal regulations, continuing review of already approved research is mandated to take place at least 12 months after this initial approval. You will receive communication from the IRB Office for this several months before the anniversary date of your initial approval.

Thank you for your cooperation.

In harmony with federal regulations, none of the investigators or research staff involved in the study took part in the final decision.

Sincerely,

Mary F. Ruzicka, Ph. D.
Mary F. Ruzicka, Ph.D.
Professor
Director, Institutional Review Board

cc: Dr. Charles Achilles

Appendix D

ACTIVE SHOOTER PREPAREDNESS SURVEY

1a. Prior to the September 1, 2005 mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office for active shooter response training, did your agency have a written plan that specified actions to be taken in the event of an active shooter in a school? Mark only one (■)

□ Yes (go to 1b.) □ No

b. Did your agency's plan include mutual aid or cooperative agreements between neighboring and / or geographically bordering jurisdictions?

□ Yes □ No

2. After the September 1, 2005 training mandate, does your agency and the police agencies that geographically border your jurisdiction have radio communication interoperability? Mark only one (■)

□ Yes □ No

3. Since the September 1, 2005 training mandate, did your agency purchase or acquire any of the following types of tactical response gear?
Mark (■) all that apply

- □ Ballistic helmets
- □ Ballistic shields
- □ Battering rams
- □ Bolt cutters
- □ Carbine or patrol rifles
- □ Hallagan or pry bars
- □ Sledge hammers

4. Since the September 1, 2005 training mandate, which activities has your agency participated in to better prepare officers to respond to an active shooter in a school? Mark (■) all that apply.

- □ Table top exercise for only your jurisdiction
- □ Multi-jurisdictional table top exercises
- □ Exercise in an empty school in your jurisdiction
- □ Exercise in a school with participant actors in your jurisdiction
- □ Multi-jurisdictional exercise in an empty school
- □ Multi-jurisdictional exercise in a school with participant actors

5. Since the September 1, 2005 training mandate how many sworn law enforcement officers in your agency were designated to train other police officers in active shooter response?

Indicate a number here _____

6. Since the September 1, 2005 training mandate how often are members of your agency required to practice scenarios, table top exercises or roll call discussions in active shooter response training or review? Mark only one (■)

- □ More often than monthly
- □ Monthly
- □ Quarterly
- □ Bi-annually
- □ Yearly
- □ Never

7. The Bergen County Prosecutor's Office has made available and distributed the *Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active Shooter Situations* model policy. Please indicate below if your agency has adopted the model policy as distributed or created an original policy.
Mark only one (■)

Adopted model policy

□ Briefly provide reasons your agency adopted the model policy_____

Created original policy

□ Briefly provide reasons your agency created an original policy _____

8. Enter the number of AUTHORIZED FULL-TIME paid agency, police officer positions as of September 1, 2005. Full-time employees are those regularly scheduled for 35 or more hours per week.

Number of police officers _____

9. Enter your agency's total operating budget for the last calendar year. If data are not available, provide an estimate and mark (■) the box below. Do NOT include building construction costs or major equipment purchases.

Data is estimated (□)

$_____

10. Enter the total estimated value of money, goods, and property received by your agency from a drug asset forfeiture program during calendar year 2007. If no money, goods or property were received, enter '0.'

$_____

11. Enter the total number of calls for service received by your agency during 2007. If data are not available, provide an estimate and mark (■) the box below.

Data is estimated (□)

Total number of calls for service _____

Appendix E

SETON HALL UNIVERSITY
1 8 5 6

December 18, 2008

Dear Chief,

My name is Jeffrey Dino and I am a Sergeant of Police with the Mahwah Police Department. I am also a doctoral candidate preparing a dissertation at Seton Hall University. My study is on Active Shooter preparedness by municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. The purpose of this letter is to ask for your assistance with this project.

My request is for you to please spare a few minutes out of your day to complete the attached survey and mail it back to me by January 7, 2008. The survey contains 11 questions that should not take very much of your time. I can assure you that no part of this survey will be seen by anyone other than me and my dissertation committee.

Once the data is collected from all participants (all 68 municipal police departments in Bergen County), the surveys will be stored in a locked fire resistant box in my home for three years as is customary in doctoral research. Further, all surveys will be coded with a control number and your agency name will not appear anywhere on the survey. These layers of security are to ensure your anonymity and reassure you that your answers to the questions in the survey will be kept private and confidential.

After you complete the survey, please mail it back to me using the self addressed stamped envelope provided with the survey.

This study has been approved by Seton Hall University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) and by the Bergen County Prosecutors Office. If you have any questions about the survey or about any of the questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 973-650-0565 or my mentor Dr. Charles Achilles 973-761-9668. If you have any questions about subject's rights in this research please contact Dr. Ruzicka at the IRB at 973-313-6314.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation in my academic endeavor.

Respectfully,

Jeffrey T. Dino

Seton Hall University
Institutional Review Board

DEC 17 2008

Approval Date

Expiration Date

DEC 17 2009

College of Education and Human Services
Department of Education Leadership, Management and Policy
Tel: 973.761.9397
400 South Orange Avenue • South Orange, New Jersey 07079-2685

Appendix F

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Q8R * Q5R	45	66.2%	23	33.8%	68	100.0%
Q9R * Q5R	40	58.8%	28	41.2%	68	100.0%
Q10R * Q5R	44	64.7%	24	35.3%	68	100.0%
Q11R * Q5R	45	66.2%	23	33.8%	68	100.0%

Q8R * Q5R

Crosstab

			Q5R			
			Low Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (0 - 2 Officers)	Medium Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (3 Officers)	High Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (More than 3 Officers)	Total
Q8R	Small Organization (1 - 20 Full-time Authorized Positions)	Count	9	5	6	20
		Expected Count	8.4	5.8	5.8	20.0
		% of Total	20.0%	11.1%	13.3%	44.4%
		Std. Residual	.2	-.3	.1	
	Medium Organization (21-30 Full-time Authorized Positions)	Count	5	3	1	9
		Expected Count	3.8	2.6	2.6	9.0
		% of Total	11.1%	6.7%	2.2%	20.0%
		Std. Residual	.6	.2	-1.0	
	Large Organization (More than 30 Full-time Authorized Positions)	Count	5	5	6	16
		Expected Count	6.8	4.6	4.6	16.0
		% of Total	11.1%	11.1%	13.3%	35.6%
		Std. Residual	-.7	.2	.6	
Total		Count	19	13	13	45
		Expected Count	19.0	13.0	13.0	45.0
		% of Total	42.2%	28.9%	28.9%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.473[a]	4	.650
Likelihood Ratio	2.753	4	.600
Linear-by-Linear Association	.475	1	.490
N of Valid Cases	45		

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.60.

Q9R * Q5R

Crosstab

			Q5R			
			Low Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (0 - 2 Officers)	Medium Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (3 Officers)	High Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (More than 3 Officers)	Total
Q9R	Low Total Operating Budget ($0 - $250,000)	Count	11	5	3	19
		Expected Count	8.6	5.7	4.8	19.0
		% of Total	27.5%	12.5%	7.5%	47.5%
		Std. Residual	.8	-.3	-.8	
	MediumTotal Operating Budget ($250,001 - $3,000,000)	Count	4	4	4	12
		Expected Count	5.4	3.6	3.0	12.0
		% of Total	10.0%	10.0%	10.0%	30.0%
		Std. Residual	-.6	.2	.6	
	High Total Operating Budget (More than $3,000,000)	Count	3	3	3	9
		Expected Count	4.1	2.7	2.3	9.0
		% of Total	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	22.5%
		Std. Residual	-.5	.2	.5	
Total		Count	18	12	10	40
		Expected Count	18.0	12.0	10.0	40.0
		% of Total	45.0%	30.0%	25.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.729[a]	4	.604
Likelihood Ratio	2.777	4	.596
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.086	1	.149
N of Valid Cases	40		

a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.25.

Q10R * Q5R

Crosstab

			Q5R			
			Low Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (0 - 2 Officers)	Medium Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (3 Officers)	High Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (More than 3 Officers)	Total
Q10R	Low Forfeiture Program - 2007 ($0 - $200)	Count	10	2	5	17
		Expected Count	7.3	5.0	4.6	17.0
		% of Total	22.7%	4.5%	11.4%	38.6%
		Std. Residual	1.0	-1.3	.2	
	Medium Forfeiture Program - 2007 ($201 - $10,000)	Count	4	9	0	13
		Expected Count	5.6	3.8	3.5	13.0
		% of Total	9.1%	20.5%	.0%	29.5%
		Std. Residual	-.7	2.6	-1.9	
	High Forfeiture Program - 2007 (More than $10,000)	Count	5	2	7	14
		Expected Count	6.0	4.1	3.8	14.0
		% of Total	11.4%	4.5%	15.9%	31.8%
		Std. Residual	-.4	-1.1	1.6	
Total		Count	19	13	12	44
		Expected Count	19.0	13.0	12.0	44.0
		% of Total	43.2%	29.5%	27.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17.685[a]	4	.001
Likelihood Ratio	19.551	4	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.988	1	.159
N of Valid Cases	44		

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.55.

Q11R * Q5R

Crosstab

			Q5R			
			Low Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (0 - 2 Officers)	Medium Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (3 Officers)	High Number of Trained Officers in Active Shooter Response (More than 3 Officers)	Total
Q11R	Low Annual Service Calls - 2007 (0 - 10,000)	Count	10	6	5	21
		Expected Count	8.9	6.1	6.1	21.0
		% of Total	22.2%	13.3%	11.1%	46.7%
		Std. Residual	.4	.0	-.4	
	Medium Annual Service Calls - 2007 (10,001 - 15,000)	Count	4	4	4	12
		Expected Count	5.1	3.5	3.5	12.0
		% of Total	8.9%	8.9%	8.9%	26.7%
		Std. Residual	-.5	.3	.3	
	High Annual Service Calls - 2007 (More than 15,000)	Count	5	3	4	12
		Expected Count	5.1	3.5	3.5	12.0
		% of Total	11.1%	6.7%	8.9%	26.7%
		Std. Residual	.0	-.3	.3	
Total		Count	19	13	13	45
		Expected Count	19.0	13.0	13.0	45.0
		% of Total	42.2%	28.9%	28.9%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.868[a]	4	.929
Likelihood Ratio	.883	4	.927
Linear-by-Linear Association	.354	1	.552
N of Valid Cases	45		

a. 4 cells (44.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.47.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Q8R * Q6R	45	66.2%	23	33.8%	68	100.0%
Q9R * Q6R	40	58.8%	28	41.2%	68	100.0%
Q10R * Q6R	44	64.7%	24	35.3%	68	100.0%
Q11R * Q6R	45	66.2%	23	33.8%	68	100.0%

Q8R * Q6R

Crosstab

			Q6R			
			Once a Quarter or Monthly	Bi-annually	Once a year or Never	Total
Q8R	Small Organization (1 - 20 Full-time Authorized Positions)	Count	5	8	7	20
		Expected Count	6.2	4.4	9.3	20.0
		% of Total	11.1%	17.8%	15.6%	44.4%
		Std. Residual	-.5	1.7	-.8	
	Medium Organization (21-30 Full-time Authorized Positions)	Count	4	1	4	9
		Expected Count	2.8	2.0	4.2	9.0
		% of Total	8.9%	2.2%	8.9%	20.0%
		Std. Residual	.7	-.7	-.1	
	Large Organization (More than 30 Full-time Authorized Positions)	Count	5	1	10	16
		Expected Count	5.0	3.6	7.5	16.0
		% of Total	11.1%	2.2%	22.2%	35.6%
		Std. Residual	.0	-1.4	.9	
Total		Count	14	10	21	45
		Expected Count	14.0	10.0	21.0	45.0
		% of Total	31.1%	22.2%	46.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.388[a]	4	.117
Likelihood Ratio	7.617	4	.107
Linear-by-Linear Association	.478	1	.490
N of Valid Cases	45		

a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.00.

Q9R * Q6R

Crosstab

			Q6R			
			Once a Quarter or Monthly	Bi-annually	Once a year or Never	Total
Q9R	Low Total Operating Budget ($0 - $250,000)	Count	8	2	9	19
		Expected Count	5.7	3.8	9.5	19.0
		% of Total	20.0%	5.0%	22.5%	47.5%
		Std. Residual	1.0	-.9	-.2	
	MediumTotal Operating Budget ($250,001 - $3,000,000)	Count	2	6	4	12
		Expected Count	3.6	2.4	6.0	12.0
		% of Total	5.0%	15.0%	10.0%	30.0%
		Std. Residual	-.8	2.3	-.8	
	High Total Operating Budget (More than $3,000,000)	Count	2	0	7	9
		Expected Count	2.7	1.8	4.5	9.0
		% of Total	5.0%	.0%	17.5%	22.5%
		Std. Residual	-.4	-1.3	1.2	
Total		Count	12	8	20	40
		Expected Count	12.0	8.0	20.0	40.0
		% of Total	30.0%	20.0%	50.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11.955[a]	4	.018
Likelihood Ratio	12.269	4	.015
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.811	1	.178
N of Valid Cases	40		

a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.80.

Q10R * Q6R

Crosstab

			Q6R			
			Once a Quarter or Monthly	Bi-annually	Once a year or Never	Total
Q10R	Low Forfeiture Program - 2007 ($0 - $200)	Count	7	4	6	17
		Expected Count	5.4	3.9	7.7	17.0
		% of Total	15.9%	9.1%	13.6%	38.6%
		Std. Residual	.7	.1	-.6	
	Medium Forfeiture Program - 2007 ($201 - $10,000)	Count	3	5	5	13
		Expected Count	4.1	3.0	5.9	13.0
		% of Total	6.8%	11.4%	11.4%	29.5%
		Std. Residual	-.6	1.2	-.4	
	High Forfeiture Program - 2007 (More than $10,000)	Count	4	1	9	14
		Expected Count	4.5	3.2	6.4	14.0
		% of Total	9.1%	2.3%	20.5%	31.8%
		Std. Residual	-.2	-1.2	1.0	
Total		Count	14	10	20	44
		Expected Count	14.0	10.0	20.0	44.0
		% of Total	31.8%	22.7%	45.5%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.362[a]	4	.252
Likelihood Ratio	5.578	4	.233
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.729	1	.189
N of Valid Cases	44		

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.95.

Q11R * Q6R

Crosstab

			Q6R			
			Once a Quarter or Monthly	Bi-annually	Once a year or Never	Total
Q11R	Low Annual Service Calls - 2007 (0 - 10,000)	Count	8	6	7	21
		Expected Count	6.5	4.7	9.8	21.0
		% of Total	17.8%	13.3%	15.6%	46.7%
		Std. Residual	.6	.6	-.9	
	Medium Annual Service Calls - 2007 (10,001 - 15,000)	Count	5	3	4	12
		Expected Count	3.7	2.7	5.6	12.0
		% of Total	11.1%	6.7%	8.9%	26.7%
		Std. Residual	.7	.2	-.7	
	High Annual Service Calls - 2007 (More than 15,000)	Count	1	1	10	12
		Expected Count	3.7	2.7	5.6	12.0
		% of Total	2.2%	2.2%	22.2%	26.7%
		Std. Residual	-1.4	-1.0	1.9	
Total		Count	14	10	21	45
		Expected Count	14.0	10.0	21.0	45.0
		% of Total	31.1%	22.2%	46.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.939[a]	4	.063
Likelihood Ratio	9.482	4	.050
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.405	1	.020
N of Valid Cases	45		

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.67.